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ABSTRACT 
 
EVALUATION OF DECENTRALIZATION OUTCOMES IN INDONESIA: 
ANALYSIS OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION SECTORS 
 
By 
RENTANIDA RENATA SIMATUPANG 
December, 2009 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
This study examines the performance of decentralized health and education service 
delivery in Indonesia. Results show that education outcomes improved with decentralization, and 
that local governments are responding to local needs for education services. Decentralization 
also brings improvement to health services, as mortality rates and life expectancy are 
significantly improved with decentralization. However, results indicate that decentralization does 
not improve availability of health services, as only small percentage of municipalities in 
Indonesia have access to health facilities.  
The empirical study on the performance of proliferated municipalities provides similar 
conclusions to those obtained in the examination of general decentralization performance. 
Proliferated municipalities experience improvement in education outcomes but not so for health 
outcomes; these results are consistent with the previous examination. Therefore, from the result 
of this study, there is no evidence to reject proliferation as it does not hurt health and education 
service delivery outcomes.
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Over the last three decades, decentralization has become a worldwide phenomenon that 
captured developed and developing countries alike. Countries around the world use 
decentralization principles with varying degrees, mostly by transferring responsibilities of public 
service delivery to lower levels of government. This study seeks to examine the effect of 
decentralization reform on service delivery in Indonesia, specifically for health and education 
services. Previously known as one of the most centralized countries in the world, Indonesia has 
moved to be one of the most decentralized ones in relatively short period since the 
implementation of decentralization in 2001. This reform brought provinces and municipalities to 
demand more autonomy, which resulted in the creation of new jurisdictions all over the country. 
The proliferation of sub national governments has significantly increased the number of sub 
national governments, from 26 provinces and 313 municipalities in 1999 to 33 provinces with 
454 municipalities in 2007.   
The well-known decentralization theorem (Oates 1972) argued that decentralization can 
improve allocative efficiency by bringing greater diversity into the supply of public services, thus 
will be able to serve heterogeneous preferences for public goods. This is known as the 
preference-matching argument. Second, decentralization is also argued to increase the productive 
efficiency of delivery of government services. The proponents of decentralization argued that 
decentralization could raise the political participation of the constituents, which would make 
local governments to be more responsive than central government to local needs (Wallis and 
Oates 1988; Shah 1999). But critics dispute that the decentralization theorem may not applicable 
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in developing countries, as most developing countries do not meet the assumptions posed by 
decentralization theorem (Bahl and Linn 1992). Local governments maybe too vulnerable to elite 
capture, have limited technical, human and financial resources, lack of accountability and are too 
corrupt to provide public goods to efficiently answer local demand (Prud'homme 1995; Crook 
and Sverrisson 1999; Tanzi, Bruno, and Pleskovic 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006).  
Despite of a growing literature on decentralization, there is limited empirical evidence 
that countries with decentralized public service delivery have also improved the efficiency and 
physical outcomes of public services. The majority of the past studies have focused on how 
decentralization affects economic outcomes (economic growth, inflation, income per capita) and 
fiscal outcomes (tax revenues, intergovernmental transfers). Empirical evidence on relationship 
between decentralization and real outcomes are remarkably few. 
 
Motivation 
The decentralization process in Indonesia is still in its infancy after the reform which 
became known as the „Big Bang‟ of decentralization in reform 2001. Although the reform seems 
to be rushed, many observers, including The World Bank, think that decentralization in 
Indonesia started off much better than expected.1 Since then, the decentralization process in 
Indonesia has caught international the attention and it is often mentioned in the studies of 
decentralization in developing countries as an example of both good and not so good practice. 
There exists a substantial amount of literature on Indonesia decentralization process, this 
literature mainly focused on the fiscal design of decentralization system such as expenditure and 
revenue assignment and also the intergovernmental transfer system. But even with much 
attention given to the decentralization process and implementation in Indonesia, the topic of 
                                               
1 Hofman and Kaiser (2004) 
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outcomes of decentralization did not receive proper attention. After almost a decade into 
decentralization era in Indonesia, it is important to assess whether decentralization has improved 
the efficiency of public spending by looking with some depth at the indicators or outputs from 
decentralized expenditures.  
The recent development of local government proliferation has raised concerns over the 
past few years, since many see the phenomenon as unjustified and harmful. With the raising 
arguments about proliferation, the Government of Indonesia has applied more stringent 
requirements for new local government creation in 2004, which at that time had stopped the 
proliferation for a few years before amendment of proliferation law in 2007. While there is much 
debate about proliferation in Indonesia, there are only a limited number of empirical studies that 
systematically examine the effect of proliferation on sub-national government efficiency. 
The purpose of this study are: (i) to examine how decentralization has affected health and 
education service delivery in Indonesia; (ii) to analyze whether decentralization improved the 
allocative efficiency of government expenditures by better matching public services with local 
needs; (iii) to examine the performance of proliferated or fragmented local governments in 
providing health and education services.   
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
 The remainder of this dissertation will be organized in the following manner: Chapter II 
presents a short history of decentralization and local government proliferation in Indonesia. 
Chapter III provides a review of the existing literature on decentralized service delivery, and a 
brief description of the education system and health services in Indonesia. The next Chapter IV 
presents the theoretical model, followed by the empirical model and data sources and the 
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empirical specifications. The results from the estimations are presented in Chapter V. The last 
chapter presents the conclusions, policy implications and suggestions for further research.  
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CHAPTER II 
DECENTRALIZATION SYSTEM IN INDONESIA 
 
History of Decentralization in Indonesia 
The Big Bang of decentralization was hardly Indonesia‟s first attempt to give some 
autonomy to lower tiers governments.2 The first law (Law No. 1/1945) right after the declaration 
of independence dealt with regional autonomy, while article 18 of the 1945 Constitution 
established the new republic as a unitary state. In response to the Declaration of Independence, 
the Dutch colonial authority set up several republics outside of Java and Madura islands to argue 
that the newly independent Republic of Indonesia was merely a part of Indonesia. This resulted 
in the birth of United Republics of Indonesia, a federal state within a commonwealth with the 
Netherlands. Under the federal state, local administration was left to the discretion of each area. 
The United Republics only lasted for less than a year and with the 1950 Provisional Constitution 
the state went back to unitary status. 
After the integration into the unitary Republic of Indonesia, regions outside of Java and 
Madura grew discontent with the central government and even attempted rebellions to 
disintegrate themselves from the Republic. Government then enacted Law No. 1/1957 
recognizing “as extensive autonomy as possible” to all three tiers of local governments. But this 
law was aborted after the outbreak of regional unrest in Sumatra, Sulawesi and West Java. 
President Soekarno in 1959 declared the reversion to the 1945 constitution and Indonesia went 
back to centralized system of government. 
The idea of local autonomy was brought back by the next president, Soeharto, but the law 
only passed the People‟s Consultative Assembly in 1974. Law No. 5/1974 clarified that the 
                                               
2 For more detailed history of decentralization in Indonesia see Hofman and Kaiser (2004) and Siddik (2007) 
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priority in local autonomy was given to the second level local governments (districts and cities). 
This law removed first tier local government (provinces) as the focus of local autonomy based on 
the experience of regional rebellions in the 1950s. In practice, this law was never fully 
implemented. As the regime aimed for political stability in response to the communist insurgence 
in 1965, the government became more centralized in many ways. In effect, the government 
dismantled village communities that have ruled themselves on the basis of common law and 
instead formed administrative villages called “desa.” With the administrative reorganization, the 
military also established the territorial security system all the way down to the desa.  
In 1995, an experimental decentralization in 26 provinces took off. Some administrative 
powers were transferred to lower tiers government but resources were not handed over together 
with the responsibilities. In the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis and the fall of Soeharto‟s 
regime, the new president Habibie (Soeharto‟s last vice president) was under pressure to deal 
with growing discontentment from the regions that have been suppressed for so long. Regions 
with long standing armed conflict histories such as Aceh and East Timor were demanding their 
independence, and East Timor gained its freedom in 1999. 
Without fully evaluating the results of the experiment, the central government moved 
toward fuller decentralization to pacify local dissatisfaction. The reform was officially started 
when the Parliament approved the Law concerning Local Administration (Law No. 22/1999) and 
the Law concerning Financial Balance between the Central and Regions (Law No. 25/1999). 
Under these laws, decentralization took the following features: greater weight was given to 
decentralization than to de-concentration; horizontal lines of responsibility were established; 
there was a clear provision for the allocation of funds from the central to local government; and 
there was a re-application of common law in village administration. A tight deadline was set for 
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January 1, 2001, by which the laws of decentralization had to be implemented. This strategy 
became known as the “Big Bang” decentralization reform in Indonesia. 
In addition to Law no. 22/1999, the Government of Indonesia also issued Government 
Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) no. 129/2000 concerning the formation, merging and 
liquidation of local governments. This regulation gives way to political and administrative 
decentralization, as in the past, the formation of new local governments were mostly the result of 
top-to-bottom initiatives. With this regulation in effect, the number of sub national government 
increased substantially after decentralization. Table 1 presents changes in the number of sub 
national government unit before and after decentralization.  
 
Table 1. Number of provinces and municipalities in Indonesia 
 
Year Provinces Municipalities/Cities 
   1998 27 289 
1999-2000* 31 338 
2001 31 351 
2002 32 388 
2003-2007* 33 454 
 
Source: MOHA 
* There were no creation of new local governments in year 2000 and 2004-2007 
 
According to PP no. 129/2000, a motion for creation of a new local government requires 
approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Imansyah and Martinez-Vazquez) which will be 
granted after passing a stringent administrative process. However, PP no. 129/2000 also 
acknowledges another avenue to proliferation that utilized local political will rather than an 
administrative process. In this process, the Regional House of Representative (DPRD) appeals 
directly to the National House of Representatives/ Parliament (DPR) without having to go 
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through technical and administrative process required by MOHA. As decentralization 
progressed, this political shortcut was used more often than MOHA‟s endorsed process, which 
raised concerns that proliferation has been merely the result of local elites‟ quest for power over 
financial resources received by newly created local governments (PERCIK 2008). Table 2 shows 
the composition of new sub national government by type of creation process. It is apparent that 
by 2003 there were more new municipalities created through the political shortcut. This direct 
creation process was even more dominant for formation of new provinces. 
 
Table 2. Creation of new sub national governments by institution controlling the process 
 
Year 
Government/MOHA   DPR/ Parliament 
Province Municipalities   Province Municipalities 
1999-2000 2 43 
 
3 
 2001 
 
12 
   2002 
 
37 
 
1 
 2003 
 
18 
  
31 
2004-2006 
   
1 
 2007 
 
5 
  
20 
2008* 
    
18 
Total 2 115 
 
5 69 
 
Source: MOHA  
* as per July 21, 2008 
 
Law no. 22/1999, one of the main law governing decentralization in Indonesia, was later 
replaced by Law no. 32/2004. This new law brings clarity to sub national government relations 
that was not addressed specifically in the previous law. Before, there was no clear hierarchical 
order on the relationship between provincial and municipal governments, which created 
coordination problem since municipalities were not required to answer to provincial government 
especially in the matter of new local government creation. This problem was addressed by Law 
no. 32/2004 which clearly stated the role of provincial administrations as representative of 
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Central government, thus giving them power to direct and coordinate municipalities within their 
region. On the other hand, since Governors are now elected by their local constituents (as 
opposed to being appointed by the President), the provincial governments are now likely to 
become more accountable locally.  
The PP no. 129/2000 concerning the formation, merging and liquidation of local 
governments was later amended with PP no. 78/2007 which is somewhat more stringent 
regarding the formation of new local government. For example, it regulates the minimum 
(administrative) size of new local government and the frequency of fragmentation. The process 
of new government creation itself is not much different from the previous regulation, in 
particular, the new PP also allows for the creation of local government directly by Parliament‟s 
political will. However, since the provincial government is provided with clear hierarchical order 
over municipalities, the governor has authority to reject a proliferation proposal that does not 
meet the minimum requirements.  With the new government regulation in effect, the next wave 
of proliferation is expected to create new local governments with better administrative, fiscal and 
technical capability. 
 
Understanding determinants of government proliferation in Indonesia 
From many extensive studies on decentralization which span over the last three decades, 
one aspect of decentralization that the literature seems to agree on are factors supporting the 
presence of decentralization. Bahl and Linn (1992) summarized the results from existing 
empirical studies and present the determinants of decentralization as:  size of country (population 
or area); stages of development (GDP); and war/crisis effect. However, Oates (1993) argued that 
this conclusion only applies for developing countries, as empirical evidence shows that more 
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industrialized countries move toward centralization. Other studies also find that ethnic diversity 
and urbanization as possible factors to support decentralization, which applies for the case of 
developing and transitional economies (Bahl and Wallace 2005).  
With decentralization reform in progress, many countries experience significant changes 
in number of sub national government. While some experience amalgamation,3 but the most 
common phenomenon is the proliferation or creation of new sub national government units. For 
the case of Indonesia, it is the proliferation (or pemekaran) that has been raising concerns 
nationwide. In many occasions, the proposals of proliferation have caused civil protests, and in 
some cases these protests ended with anarchy.4 
While there has been much debate on proliferation, there are only limited numbers of 
empirical studies that explore the determinants and impact of this phenomenon. Among the first 
to systematically study the proliferation in Indonesia was Fitrani, Hofman and Kaiser (2005) 
which observed pre and post decentralization proliferation events.  Based on the observation that 
jurisdiction proliferation did not happen to all local governments, this study seek to identify 
factors that contribute to the probability of splitting. This study utilized a logit regression method 
to estimate the joint influence of those motivations above to the likelihood of splitting. They 
proposed four hypotheses motivating the establishment of new regions:  
- Administrative dispersion: for jurisdictions that may be too large and populations that 
too dispersed. 
                                               
3 Darby, Muscatelli and Roy (2005) documented the successful attempts of consolidation of government units in the 
following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
4 The latest incidence was the death of chairman of Regional House of Representative of North Sumatera at  the 
protest supporting the establishment of Tapanuli district as an independent province (Tempo Interaktif, February 3, 
2009) 
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- Preference for homogeneity: people may prefer to live in a more homogenous in 
terms of ethnicity, language, religion, or even income level 
- Fiscal spoils: splitting could bring additional fiscal resources in the form of general 
transfer, revenue sharing, or locally derived revenues. Particular incentive for 
splitting is the lump sum allocation in DAU as the existing and new region will each 
receive the lump sum. As for revenue sharing, the new region‟s gain from larger share 
of the revenue comes at the expense of the other region. 
- Bureaucratic and political rent seeker: local bureaucrats/vested interests can be 
benefit directly from the creation of new local governments; especially if there is 
additional fiscal revenues will accrue to the new administration.  
The hypothesized determinants of proliferation from this study are somewhat similar to 
the determinants of decentralization, which is understandable since proliferation mostly appears 
following decentralization reform. The findings support the “dispersion hypothesis” and 
“homogeneity hypothesis” in public finance; those jurisdictions with greater area are more likely 
to experience the split while jurisdictions with more homogenous ethnic background are likely to 
stay together. They also found that wage of government officials are significant to increase 
likelihood of proliferation after decentralization, which indicates that local bureaucrats may gain 
prominence with decentralization.  However, the results do not support the “fiscal spoil” 
hypothesis as revenue sharing from natural resources only increase likelihood of split for pre-
decentralization events.  
Another important research in this area is by Qibthiyyah (2008), who provides a dynamic 
study on the formation of local governments by exploring how economic and political factors 
may affect the proliferation decision. This study uses logit and probit estimation method to 
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examine the likelihood of jurisdiction split events and panel count regression (negative binomial 
method) for an evaluation of the number of new local governments created from 1993-2004. The 
hypotheses tested in this study are somewhat similar to the ones tested by Fitrani et al. (2005), 
which tested for dispersion, homogeneity, fiscal spoil hypotheses, with addition to the possibility 
of increase in political bargaining as another factor supporting proliferation. 
 The findings from Qibthiyyah (2008) give more insight into the determinants of 
proliferation. The main difference with the results in the previous study by Fitrani et al. (2005) is 
that Qibthiyyah found evidence supporting the “fiscal spoil” hypothesis, that economic 
incentives is an important factor for the probability of splitting as well as on the extent of 
proliferation, but the impact varies from one type of transfer to another. Among all forms of 
intergovernmental transfers, only DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus/ Special Grants) and tax revenue 
sharing increase the probability of splitting. As for the duration of split,  regions with higher 
share of tax revenue were likely to be the first to experience split since the beginning of 
decentralization, however it will take longer for them to experience the second (or next) split.  
Qibthiyyah‟s results also support the “dispersion hypothesis” as one of the determinant of 
proliferation with an increase in the likelihood of split for larger numbers of population. 
However, instead of a linear relationship, the results show an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between population and number of new local governments. This finding reflects the presence of 
economies of scale associated with the creation of new local governments, as proliferation would 
be efficient for jurisdictions up to a certain number of populations and inefficient for regions 
with much larger population. 
Another interesting finding from Qibthiyyah‟s study is on how local political competition 
contributes to the probability of jurisdiction split. The results show that local governments with 
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lower political competition (i.e., existence of majority political party in the local assembly 
council) have higher probability of splitting, and that local politicians capitalized on the political 
gains associated with the creation of a new jurisdiction. For politicians from the ruling party, it is 
easier to be elected or re-elected in the new jurisdiction (smaller size jurisdiction requires less 
votes compared to the originating jurisdiction). 
The most recent empirical study by Imansyah and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) utilizes a 
different econometric approach to examine the determinants of proliferation, but the testable 
hypotheses are very much similar with the previous studies. Instead of examining the probability 
of split, they seek to explain the number and growth rate of local governments using a panel 
regression method. The observations covered the number of municipalities in 25 provinces 
(number of provinces before decentralization, excluding the capital DKI Jakarta) over the year 
1999-2006. This study adds to the literature by testing more variables that could be associated to 
each hypothesis, while also testing for variables related to institutional and policy characteristic 
of proliferated local governments such as: level of development; history of ethnic violence 
within the region; and history of civil unrest/separatism movements.  
In general, results of this study conform to findings from the previous works. They found 
that dispersion hypothesis to be valid, that higher population density tends to more 
fragmentation. Fiscal incentives also proved to be a motive for proliferation, specifically, in the    
case of transfer involving the lump sum component in the DAU (Dana Alokasi Umum/ General 
purpose grants) and DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus/ Special purpose grant). In line with findings of 
Fitrani et al. (2005), higher revenue sharing from natural resources does not contribute to 
proliferation, most likely due to the fact that resource rich regions (such as Aceh, Papua, and 
Riau) have undergone proliferation processes at the very beginning of decentralization era and 
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that they do not feel the need for more proliferation in their areas. However, localities with 
higher share of tax revenue and higher wage expenditure per capita are more likely to be 
proliferated, which also supports the fiscal incentives hypothesis. Contradictory with the 
previous findings, Imansyah and Martinez-Vazquez found that the separatism movements and 
ethnic conflicts do not necessarily increase local demand for proliferation.  
To conclude the literature review on determinants of proliferation in Indonesia, Table 3 
presents the compilation of findings in the three previous studies. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of proliferation in Indonesia 
 
Hypotheses 
Imansyah, Martinez-
Vazquez (2009) 
  Qibthiyyah (2008)   
Fitrani, Hofman, 
Kaiser (2005) 
# of 
municipal 
Growth # 
municipal   
Prob. 
to 
split 
# of 
municipal   
Pre-
decent. 
prob. to 
split 
Post-
decent. 
prob. 
to split 
         Dispersion 
        1. Population + - 
  
+ 
 
N/S +/- 
2. Population squared 
    
- 
   3. Area + + 
    
+ + 
4. Density - N/S 
      5. # of provincial split N/S N/S 
      
         Fiscal incentives 
        1. DAU/capita + - 
 
N/S 
    2. Median share of DAU 
    
+ 
   3. Natural resource revenue 
share/ capita - N/S 
 
+ 
  
+ - 
4. Tax revenue share/ 
capita + - 
 
N/S 
    5. DAK/ capita + N/S 
 
+ 
    6. Wage expenditure/ 
capita + - 
    
+ + 
         Homogeneity & civil 
society 
       
  
1. Ethnic fractionalization 
index (diversity) 
    
+ 
 
  N/S 
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Table 3. Determinants of proliferation in Indonesia (continued) 
 
Hypotheses 
Imansyah, Martinez-
Vazquez (2009) 
  Qibthiyyah (2008)   
Fitrani, Hofman, 
Kaiser (2005) 
# of 
municipal 
Growth # 
municipal   
Prob. 
to 
split 
# of 
municipal   
Pre-
decent. 
prob. to 
split 
Post-
decent. 
prob. 
to split 
         2. Ethnic clustering 
(homogeneity) 
      
N/S 
 3. Dummy separatism (for 
Aceh and Papua) 
N/S N/S +    
 
4. Dummy ethnic conflict - N/S 
      5. Number of active NGOs 
    
N/S 
   
         Stage of development  
        1. GDRP/ capita N/S N/S 
  
N/S 
   2. Development 
expenditure/ capita 
       
- 
3. Household expenditure 
distribution 
    
- 
   4. % population with 
secondary education 
       
+ 
5. % poor population N/S N/S 
      
         Political incentives 
        1. Presence of majority 
party (GOLKAR) 
      
- - 
2. Political competition         -     N/S 
         Note: N/S not significant 
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON HEALTH AND EDUCATION SECTORS IN 
DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM 
 
 
Education and Health System in Indonesia
5
 
Education  
 Education in Indonesia consists of 2 years of kindergarten followed by 6 grades of 
elementary school and 3 grades each of junior and senior secondary school. After high school, 
graduates can continue to diploma or other type of higher education including university, for 
which times to completion depends on the program.  Law No. 20/2003 of the National Education 
System states that every citizen aged 7-15 years must attend basic education, which implies that 
the government should provide free educational service to all students at the basic education 
level.  
 The World Bank reported that the enrollment rates have increased significantly since the 
1970s, due to the government‟s sustained drive to build school across the country. The net 
primary enrollment rate was 93% for elementary school, 65.2 % for junior secondary school and 
41.7% for senior secondary school in 2005. Although the growth rate is impressive, enrollment 
rate differences among regions are significant. Given the size, development stage, and diversity 
of the country, enrollment rate varies from the highest rate in Java to the lowest in Papua.  
Increases in the number of students receiving education services have not been 
necessarily followed by improvements in the quality of education services.  The report from The 
World Bank documented that quality of schooling is relatively low due to factors such as low 
level of teacher qualifications, structure of teacher compensation, teacher attendance rates, large 
                                               
5 This part is largely taken from Indonesia Public Expenditure Review (PER) 2007 and Investing in Indonesian 
Education: Allocation, Equity and Efficiency of Public Expenditures (The World Bank, 2007)   
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class size, and low quality of infrastructure. Compared with students from neighboring countries, 
students in Indonesia fared poorly on mathematics and language standardized test. In general, the 
education system has not yet been able to produce more students with the skills and knowledge 
required to work in economic sectors with high growth potential. 
 
Table 4. Nominal education expenditures by level of government and trend of national education 
expenditures (Trillion Rupiah) 2001-2004 
 
 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 
Central 14.1 33.3 14.7 28.7 22.5 34.7 19.4 31.4 
Provincial 2.0 4.7 4.0 7.8 3.9 6.1 2.6 4.2 
Municipalities 26.2 61.9 32.6 63.5 38.3 59.2 39.8 64.4 
Total National Expenditure 42.3 100 51.3 100 64.7 100 61.8 100 
         
Growth national nominal 
expenditure   21.28  26.12  -4.48   
Education expenditure  
(% national expenditure)  11.96  15.19  15.96  13.99 
Education expenditure  
(%GDP)  2.51  3.09  3.81  3.42 
 
Source: PER Indonesia 2007 (The World Bank) 
 
 Since the 1990s, national expenditure in education has shown an upward trend except 
during the economic crisis. After decentralization, the education sector became the highest 
expenditure category in Indonesia, counting for 13.99% of total national public expenditure in 
2004. The majority of education expenditures were spent at the sub national level as shown by 
the Table 2. The largest share of district expenditures is spent on nondiscretionary routine 
expenditure, which is allocated to personnel spending.  
One special feature of public spending on education in Indonesia is the existence of the 
“20% Mandate,” a stipulation in the Constitution that was passed in 2002. This article mandates 
that at a minimum, 20% of government budget needs to be allocated for education sector. Later 
in 2003, it was amended to exclude teachers‟ salary from the mandate. This stipulation has since 
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created debates among bureaucrats, legislators, and the teacher unions since each party has 
interpreted this mandate differently. To fulfill this mandate without including teachers‟ salary 
would put too much strain on the government budget, as salary is one of major components of 
education expenditure.  
The challenge for the education system in the near future is to focus the attention on 
secondary education, especially at the junior high school level. In 2004, 56% of total education 
spending was allocated to primary education, while junior and senior secondary allocation has 
15% shared each and tertiary education receive 12% of total spending. With the success of 
reaching almost 100% enrollment rates for primary education, it is time to extend resources to 
improve junior secondary education to ensure that all children in Indonesia will receive at least 9 
years of education. 
 
Health  
 For many Indonesians, health service is a service they only have limited access to. In 
most rural areas, the closest place to get health services is the community health center 
(Puskesmas) and integrated health posts (Posyandu) for infant/toddler health care services. Just 
like in many developing countries, there is a shortage in health professionals which also worsen 
by uneven distribution of personnel. In 2003, Indonesia had the lowest physician density 
(number of physicians per 100,000 populations) within its ASEAN neighbors. Ratios of nurses 
and midwives per population are higher than physicians, but the distribution varies greatly 
among regions. 
Indicators and outcomes from the health sector shows that the Indonesian health sector is 
well below other countries in the region. Indonesia still compares poorly with its neighbors on 
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most conventional health outputs such as life expectancy, under 5 mortality rate, maternal 
mortality rate, and immunization rate. On the other hand, the infant and child mortality rate 
shows improvement over the time. The infant mortality rate fell from 46 per 1,000 live births in 
1997 to 35 per 1,000 live births in 2003. 
Indonesia‟s lack of a social security or insurance system leave the majority of  the 
population with lower income at risk of not getting sufficient, if any, health services. The 
National Social Survey data (SUSENAS) 2004 shows that household out of pocket fees continue 
to constitute the majority of total health expenditures. In 2004, Indonesian households 
contributed to 55% of total health expenditures. In total, about 3.5% of total household 
expenditures are currently spent on the health sector but this trend is declining since more 
Indonesians prefer self medication instead of seeing a professional health care. Despite of the 
effort made to expand the public health care system, access and quality of health care remains 
low and people rely heavily on private sector provision. More than half of the hospitals belong to 
the private sector and for the most part they do not provide specialized care services. The World 
Bank reported that given the relatively low quality of public hospitals, only 45% of sick people, 
even those with low income, seek health services from public hospitals. 
Unlike the education sector, the health sector in Indonesia has relative little importance in 
government expenditures. In 2001, health expenditures only accounted for 2.6% of total national 
expenditure and increased to 3.3% in 2004. Table 4 shows that just like education, the majority 
of health expenditures were spent at the municipal/district level. While the nominal expenditure 
is lower compared to education expenditure, the growth trend shows that the government has 
increased the budget allocation to the health sector.  
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Table 5. Nominal health expenditures per level of government and trend of health expenditure 
2001-2004 (Trillion Rupiah) 
 
 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 
Central 3.1 33.7 2.9 26.4 5.7 35.6 5.6 31.6 
Provincial 1.7 18.5 2.4 21.8 2.8 17.5 4.0 22.6 
Municipalities 4.4 47.8 5.7 51.8 7.5 46.9 8.1 45.8 
Total National Expenditure 9.2 100 11.0 100 16.0 100 17.7 100 
         
Growth national nominal 
expenditure   19.56  45.45  10.63   
Health expenditure  
(% national expenditure)  2.6  3.3  3.9  4.0 
Health expenditure  
(%GDP)  0.5  0.6  0.8  0.8 
 
Source: PER Indonesia 2007 (World Bank 2007) 
 
Overall, The World Bank evaluated the quality of healthcare services in Indonesia as low, 
with low availability of medication, inadequate infrastructure and often an insufficient supply of 
healthcare personnel. Given the importance of the health sector to development in general, it is 
advisable for the government to allocate more resources to the health sector. 
 
Literature Review on Decentralized Education and Health Sectors 
Review of International Experience 
After more than three decades of decentralization reform worldwide, there exists a vast 
literature on the architecture of decentralization, technical mechanisms of intergovernmental 
transfers, and overall relationship between decentralization and economic outcomes such as 
economic growth (Davoodi and Zou 1998; Zhang and Zou 1998; McNab 2001; Lewis 2005). 
However, there are fewer studies focused on how decentralization has improved efficiency in 
public good provision, namely examining the relationship between decentralization reforms and 
outcomes of public services. This also holds for the case of Indonesia, where majority of 
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research has focused on the design of intergovernmental transfer system. For the last decade, the 
main concern of decentralization reform in Indonesia was the distribution of funds from the 
central to local government through various types of grants.  
 While many countries devolve or delegate education and health services provision to sub-
national governments, there is little evidence that countries which have decentralized their health 
and education expenditure also have improved the outputs of those sectors. Most of the past 
studies, done in a qualitative manner, have helped to understand the pros and cons of 
decentralization, but the magnitude of its impacts on health and education outputs for the most 
part remained unidentified. When the magnitude is unidentified, it is difficult to measure the cost 
and benefit of decentralization, which is crucial to the design of sound public policy.  
 In the case of health sector, studies evaluating the impact of decentralization in 
developing countries have provided mixed results. The existing literature pointed out that health 
and decentralization is associated with problems such as increase in regional disparities due to 
the absence of a mechanism to transfer resources from rich to poor districts. Another major 
problem in health service is the lack of skilled personnel, lack of information and the loss of 
economies of scale that counteract the potential efficiency gains from devolution (Robalino, 
Picazo, and Voetberg 2001). Similarly, West and Wong (1995) also found that decentralization 
increased regional disparity in provision of health and education services in China. 
The widely cited study by Strumpf et al. (1999) is among the first to systematically 
examine the allocative efficiency changes from provision of public good in a developing country 
(Uganda). 6  They collected three years of district level health budget data following the 
decentralization in Uganda. The data provided extensive details on the allocation decisions made 
by local government officials and the type of health activities/services undertaken each year. The 
                                               
6 Later updated and published in Journal of Development Studies as Akin, Hutchinson and Strumpf (2005) 
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results lead to the conclusion that not all was favorable to decentralization; in particular that local 
government health planner was allocating declining proportions of their budgets to public goods 
activities. 
Another study on a developing country, the Philippines (Schwartz, Guilkey, and Rachelis 
2002) used annual audited expenditure data combined by secondary census and demographic 
survey data for nearly 1600 local government before and after decentralization in the Philippines. 
The results of this study show that although the local expenditures increased after 
decentralization, local governments decreased the share of revenue allocated to public health. 
They also provide strong evidence that public health expenditures at both the province and 
municipality level have a positive impact on the use of family planning and children vaccination 
coverage. 
Habibi et al. (2003) regressed infant mortality rate as the indicator of human development 
with two devolution indicators (provincially controlled resources and share of provincial taxes 
over total provincially controlled resources) using provincial expenditure for Argentina 
between1970-1994. The result shows that infant mortality has a significant and negative 
association with the percent of revenue that is raised locally and with degree of local control over 
provincial fiscal resources.  
In a cross country study using panel of low and high income countries covering the 
period 1970-1995, Robalino et al. (2001) found that countries where local governments manage 
a higher share of public expenditures tend to have lower mortality rates. The authors noted that 
the results should not be interpret as decentralizing the management of public resources will 
automatically improve health outputs, but more to support the view that if institutional capacity 
at the local level is improved then fiscal decentralization is likely to improve health outputs. 
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Similar result also found by using data set of 52 developed and developing countries from year 
1972-1990, where decentralization appears to lower the rate of infant mortality for developed 
countries on the sample (McNab 2001). 
The effect of decentralization to education sector seems similar for developing and 
developed countries. Faguet (2004) used Bolivian municipalities data before and after 
decentralization to test whether decentralization make public investment to be more responsive 
to local needs. The result shows that the pattern of public investment after decentralization 
differs significantly for several sectors, including education.  Investment rises under 
decentralization where the need of education is greater, which is proxied by higher illiteracy rate. 
For  Colombia, similar shift of public investment towards health and education sector also exists 
(Faguet and Sanchez 2006).     
The productive efficiency from decentralization in these following studies shows positive 
effects of decentralization on educational outputs. Habibi et al. (2003) used secondary enrollment 
ratio per 1,000 student in Argentina as the indicator of human development and found that the 
decentralization measures have positive and significant impact on enrollment ratio. They 
conclude that decentralization is good for education, that allowing provinces to raise more of 
their own resources is conducive to improve the educational output.   
Faguet and Sanchez (2006) also find positive and significant evidence that 
decentralization improves public school enrollment in Colombia. Enrollment increases in 
districts where central government have little say in educational finance and policy making, 
while decreases in districts with greater control from the central government. They suggest that 
this was not merely the increasing in financing levels, but due instead to the quality of 
investment that municipalities achieved – to how and where funds were spent.  
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For developed countries, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) analyzed the effects of 
decentralization on the number of students who obtain the university entrance level qualification 
(maturité rate) in Switzerland. Their results show that the degree of decentralization is positively 
related with educational attainment. Pena (2006) measured the relationship between 
decentralization in Spain and the survival rate; proportion of students in the last course of ESO 
(compulsory education) who access to Bachillerato (non compulsory education); also shows the 
positive impact on education outcomes. Result suggests that increase in the survival rate has 
been mainly motivated by an improvement in government efficiency. Another study on Spain  
also support the conclusion that decentralization has lead to better adjustment between 
investment pattern and local need, thus supporting the decentralization theorem (Sole-Olle and 
Esteller-More 2005). 
 
 Review of Health and Education Sector Performance in Indonesia 
 So far, existing works on decentralization in Indonesia have mainly focused on the design 
of fiscal decentralization (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Indrawati 2004); how expenditures 
should be delegated and how intergovernmental transfer should be distributed (Alm, Aten, and 
Bahl 2001; Silver, Azis, and Schroeder 2001; Brodjonegoro and Martinez-Vazquez 2002; Fane 
2003; Sidik and Kadjatmiko 2004). Outside of fiscal architecture, there exists literature on 
economic outcomes of decentralization such as growth (Balisacan, Pernia, and Asra 2003; 
McCulloch and Sjahrir 2008), income disparities (Shah and Shankar 2001), or fiscal outcomes 
(Lewis 2005), but as remarked earlier, there are limited number of studies on the effect of 
decentralization on social sector such as health and education.    
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 To evaluate decentralized service delivery and governance in the decentralized era in 
Indonesia, The World Bank performed the Governance and Decentralization Survey (GDS) in 
2002 and later updated in 2004 and 2005. This study designed to gauge citizens‟ perception of 
quality of service provision through household survey in randomly sampled cities and 
municipalities. Citizens were asked whether they were satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat 
unsatisfied or unsatisfied with the various public services and which factors contributed to their 
perceived satisfaction. The latest GDS2 in 2005 covers 90 cities and municipalities in 26 
provinces (Widayanti and Suharyadi 2008). 
 The results of GDS2 show that 54% of respondents declared that they are satisfied with 
education service, 32% are somewhat satisfied, 12% are somewhat unsatisfied and only 2% are 
unsatisfied. Factors associated with increase in satisfaction are: condition of classrooms and 
school accessibility by road; while factors that lower citizens‟ satisfaction are student-teacher 
ratio and percentage of teachers with status as civil servants (perceived as teachers with lower 
qualifications compared to contract teachers). Meanwhile, factors such as teacher‟s age, number 
of student per classroom and hours of instruction improve satisfaction only up to a certain level 
before becoming factors of dissatisfaction.  
 For health sector, 58% respondents were satisfied, 32% were somewhat satisfied, 8% 
were somewhat unsatisfied and 2% were unsatisfied with the quality of service. Factors 
associated with improvement in satisfaction are: quality of inputs (human resources, medicinal 
supplies), availability of supporting facilities to the community health center/Puskesmas (such as 
mobile clinics, ancillary clinics), while slower speed of service and longer waiting time 
contributes to lower respondents‟ satisfaction. Interestingly, the quality of health infrastructures 
itself does not determine the satisfaction level. 
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 The result of unlikely high satisfaction for relatively low quality services is a common 
problem in similar surveys that use “perception” data. First of all, there may be a “courtesy bias” 
where people may be responding in a polite manner to survey questions without expressing their 
true sentiments. Second, citizens may have low expectation of public service, thus the current 
service quality already surpassed their expectation. Lastly, respondents may be relatively 
inclined to positive outcomes. All these factors may contribute to higher satisfaction level for 
health and education service, which does not necessarily correspondent to the actual quality of 
service (Lewis and Pattinasarany 2009; Dasgupta, Narayan, and Skoufias 2009). Therefore, 
results from GDS and other “score card” type of studies have to be interpreted with caution. 
The increasing concern about proliferation in the recent years has expanded literature on 
decentralization in Indonesia with studies focused on the effects of new government creations. 
Similar to the literature of decentralization outcomes, the existing research on proliferation also 
mostly focused on the fiscal outcomes. A study by BAPPENAS & UNDP (2008) found that: 
fiscal performance of newly created municipalities is lower compared to its originating 
municipalities; the proliferated localities (newly created and originating ones) have higher fiscal 
dependency compared to the non proliferated municipalities. Another study uses simulation of 
opportunity costs associated with creation of new municipalities, which estimated prohibitively 
high amount of aggregate public investment loss7 due to proliferation (Oosterman 2007). 
To evaluate service delivery in the proliferated areas, the study by BAPPENAS & UNDP 
(2008) use measures of inputs in 2001-2005 as a proxy to measure service outcomes. For the 
education sector, the survey finds that schools in proliferated municipalities have lower capacity 
                                               
7 Oosterman (2007) estimated that foregone public investment in year 2007 to reach Rp. 9.1 trillion (approximately 
US$ 910 million). He identified two potential source of this lost: “sticky” routine expenditure effect when 
originating municipalities‟ expenditure do not get adjusted for serving smaller population; and lump sum effect 
where each municipality will receive less transfer since there are more municipalities to share the transfer with. 
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and higher student-teacher ratios compared to the non proliferated counterpart. Within the 
proliferated group itself, schools in newly created districts have lower capacity compared to the 
originating ones. This conclusion is consistent for all surveyed education levels.  
For the health sector, the same study found that the proliferated municipalities experience 
higher growth rate in number of health facilities compared to the non proliferated ones. 
Compared to the originating municipalities, the growth rate of health facilities is lower in the 
newly created districts. However, the growth rates of medical personnel for proliferated areas are 
significantly lower compared to the non proliferated ones, which emphasize the unevenness of 
health workers distribution in Indonesia.  
While not exactly designed to evaluate effect of proliferation, Governance and 
Decentralization Survey (GDS2) in 2006 provides some conclusion on resident satisfaction 
regarding general service delivery in proliferated areas. GDS2 observes lower actual service 
quality in proliferated areas, which attributes to lower resident satisfaction compared to non 
proliferated ones. However, the most comprehensive study to date is by Qibthiyyah (2008), 
which utilizes dynamic panel regression to analyze the impact of proliferation in two time 
sequences: first as (all year) post event impact, second as year-by-year (duration) from the event 
of proliferation. The purpose of doing this analysis with different time spans was to anticipate the 
possibility that the impact on outcomes would vary with the duration of being proliferated. 
The econometrics method used in this study is the Difference-in-Difference (DID) 
method to isolate the effect of proliferation (the treatment) by analyzing the difference in 
outcomes for the proliferated municipalities (treated group) before and after the treatment 
compared to outcomes at the same period for the non proliferated group (control group). Data 
used is panel of municipal health and education outcomes from 1994-2004, which later 
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distinguished to full sample data and restricted data (only the proliferated municipalities to better 
understand the impact on newly created versus originating municipality). However, the only 
health outcome observed was infant mortality rate (IMR) while for education outcomes there are 
dropout rate, test score, and graduation rate. With this unbalance number of outcomes, the results 
of this study do not necessarily give general comparison of health versus education service 
delivery. 
For all year post event impact analysis, infant mortality rate in proliferated municipalities 
is lower than the non proliferated group.  For education outcomes, the results show that 
proliferation affect them negatively. Test score and graduation rate are lower for the proliferated 
group, with newly created municipalities fare worse than the originating ones. Among all 
education outcomes examined, only dropout rate improves after proliferation. 
The results from year-to-year (duration of being proliferated) analysis are consistent with 
findings from the full year post event estimation. From the duration analysis, infant mortality 
rates in newly created municipalities are significantly lower regardless of duration of 
proliferation. The result also shows that proliferation improved dropout rate in new 
municipalities, and this improvement started as early in second year after proliferation.   
Consistent with findings from the full year post event estimation, proliferation does not have 
positive impact on test scores and graduation rate.  Results show that new municipalities have 
lower graduation rate, regardless of how long they have been proliferated. Meanwhile, new 
municipalities also have lower test scores, but it is only significant for municipalities that have 
been proliferated for 3 years.  
  Since there are only limited literature on service delivery outcomes in Indonesia, there is 
an urgent need for a more comprehensive examination on the effect of decentralization on health 
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and education outcomes. Similarly, there is much concern about process and motivation behind 
creation of new municipalities, but there is lack of empirical analysis to establish whether or not 
proliferation improves service delivery. This study aimed to fill this gap in the literature by 
providing evidence on how health and education outcomes change with decentralization and 
proliferation. Beyond being a test of the increased efficiency associated with decentralization, 
this study will also provide useful policy implications to improve local government‟s capacity to 
deliver public service. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORECTICAL MODEL 
 
The theoretical model in this study follows the study by Humplick and Moini-Araghi 
(1996) that analyzes the relationship between decentralization and public service delivery.  This 
study built on the premise that decentralization improves efficiency of service delivery or 
performance thus improving the outcomes compared to service delivery under centralized 
regime. With some modifications, the similar approach is appropriate to analyze the changes in 
measured output of health and education service in Indonesia due to decentralization.   
Humplick and Moini-Araghi‟s (1996) study focused on examining the effects of 
decentralization on road service delivery, which utilized the extended double cost model first 
developed by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). The application of Laffont and Tirole (1993) model 
for efficiency of producing goods in a multiproduct framework to the double cost model makes it 
applicable to the case of providing road services, and also for other public services such as health 
and education.   
 
Production of health and education services 
 An agency j, which may be centralized or decentralized, is responsible for providing 
services to a certain jurisdiction i. The agent produce services generating vector of outputs q, 
measured in term of quality of service provided. For health and education services, quality is 
measured by the share of population with access to achieve nationally set health and education 
policy outcomes.  
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The agent receives transfer of τk from three main sources: central government (k=1); user 
charges (k=2); non-users (k=3) that contribute in the form of general taxes they pay to central 
government that may be used to finance the said service. For simplicity, let assume that τ3 are not 
measurable since this contribution is not only in tax money but also with externalities they may 
bear from the service. The agent may choose to combine the following financings options: use all 
transfer money available; add their own resource to the transfer; or expend some effort to use the 
transfer money more efficiently. The agency‟s accountability is then corresponding to the share 
of each source‟s contribution to the cost of provision.  
In the case of decentralized service provision, the accountability of the agent is related to 
the local government‟s contribution to the cost or the degree of decentralization, β, which is 
defined as follow: 
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where Στ1 is the sum of general transfer from the central government, Ni is the number of sub-
national government level i, and Cij is the cost of provision of related public service in 
jurisdiction j. For simplification, Cij will be written as C since in this study we do not 
differentiate the cost between jurisdiction j=1, 2,… Then the degree of decentralization is 
defined as the average share of government level i to the cost of provision. The decentralization 
parameter β ranges from 0 for the case of complete centralization to 100 percent where local 
governments are completely decentralized.  
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Cost structure 
 Extending the double cost approach by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), the cost of public 
service provision distinguishes between resource costs or input costs RC (that is, the costs of 
provision, administration, and maintenance of infrastructure); and the preference costs P(q) (the 
costs incurred by health and education service users due to limited availability or low 
performance of health and education services). In order to maximize welfare from the provision 
of public service, society seeks to minimize the sum of resource cost and preference cost to 
produce outputs at quality q. 
 
Resource cost 
 Consider the first category of costs, the resource costs: 
RC = C + Θ       (2) 
Resource costs are comprised of observable, C and unobservable cost Θ. The observable cost C 
is defined as: 
C  = C(e , q)       (3) 
where observable cost is the total cost of producing health and education services at quality q. In 
the production process, agent j can use a low (e = el) or high (e = e
h
) level of effort for a fixed 
degree of decentralization β. 8 Humplick and Moini-Araghi (1996) assume that degree of effort e 
is not directly observable, but it is greatly determined by efficiency and voter satisfaction 
objectives. Two agents operating within the same level of decentralization may employ different 
levels of effort, thus resulting in different performance in terms of resource savings. 
                                               
8 Laffont and Tirole (1993) adopt the term “effort” from the theory of the firms, which is defined as the degree of 
attention paid by a manager to reduce costs to improve performance. 
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 Let‟s assume that an agent (such as a local government) receives a general transfer of τ1 
from the central government for producing health and education services. The local government 
is set to try to meet local preference through expenditure C and degree of effort e. At a lower 
degree of decentralization, the local government will finance the provision expenses by using all 
or most of the transfer τ1 since they have little incentive to be more efficient by extending more 
effort. On the other hand, local government with a higher degree of fiscal decentralization is 
closer to the local voters, thus may try to reduce expenditure C by expending more effort e so 
that the transfer τ1 can be used for more or other service to meet voter‟s preference. Agent or 
local government‟s costs in expending the effort e can be presented as a disutility of effort: 
)(1 eU          (4a) 
Using the definition of β in equation (1), then equation (4a) can be rewritten as: 
)()1( eNCU i        (4b) 
The function ψ(e) represents the cost of effort to an agent or local government, such as the cost 
of reducing the resource costs RC and the cost of raising more revenue to fulfill voter‟s demand. 
 The relationship between the level of effort expended, e, and degree of decentralization, 
β, is derived from the disutility of effort in equation (4a): 
eU
Ue





/
/ 

      (5a) 


 



 iNCe       (5b) 
Since the level of decentralization and the cost functions are positive, equation (5b) will take a 
positive sign. Then it is presumed that effort is an increasing function of degree of 
decentralization, such that the local government will put more effort under a decentralized 
provision of public services of quality q at cost C. 
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 Since effort is a function of decentralization degree, resource costs can be written as: 
),(),()( qeqCqRC        (6) 
The established literature of decentralization provides some arguments that is useful to explore 
how cost may vary with the different degrees of decentralization. The literature suggests that 
central government has the economies of scale due to administrative and technological 
advantages, which is lost in the inception of decentralization with the increase cost of provision 
by local government (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Oates 1972).  
Based on these arguments, the relationship between cost and degree of decentralization 
are assumed to be: 
max0 




Lif
C
     (7) 
Hif
C




 max0      (8) 
where: 
βmax = level of decentralization that maximizes resource cost 
βL = minimum level of decentralization or zero decentralization (fully centralized) 
βH = maximum level of decentralization (100 percent decentralized) 
Following the diseconomies of scale argument from decentralization, the cost of 
provision of public service is increasing up to a certain degree of decentralization. However, it is 
also reasonable to assume that costs increase at decreasing rate with decentralization, especially 
when the local government has achieved the necessary technological skill to provide the service 
efficiently. Then, the rate of change of resource cost with respect to different degree of 
decentralization is: 
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Preference costs 
The second category of cost is the preference costs, which are the costs incurred by local 
residents due to the mismatch between demand and supply of quality health and education 
services provided by local governments. Preference costs derived from the social value 
associated to the outcome q: 
)),(,()( CerPqP        (10) 
where P(q) is the perceived value of the quality of health and education service defined as the 
disutility of lack or low quality of service. The equation (10) shows that the preference cost is 
determined by the degree of decentralization, as well by the effort e extended in the production 
of service at cost C written as the transformation function r (e, C).  
The relationship between preference costs and degree of decentralization are drawn from 
the basic arguments of fiscal decentralization. One of the advantages of decentralization is the 
allocative efficiency argument (Musgrave 1969), which argues that decentralization brings 
government closer to the people so that they can better answer to local preference. 
Decentralization also improves public participation in the decision-making mechanism, thus 
increasing accountability of local officials. Research shows evidence of better service delivery 
due to improvement in accountability in decentralized system (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). 
Therefore, the relationship between preference cost and decentralization is assumed to be: 
min0 




Lif
P
     (11) 
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Hif
P




 min0      (12) 
where: 
βmin = level of decentralization that minimize preference cost 
βL = minimum level of decentralization or zero decentralization (fully centralized) 
βH = maximum level of decentralization (100 percent decentralized) 
  Preference costs decrease with decentralization up to a certain degree, as decentralized 
local government has better ability to match the local preference. However, as decentralization 
progresses to the level where the government becomes too fragmented, we may expect that the 
allocative efficiency gain to be declining as the cost of decision-making increases when the local 
governments become too small. Therefore, the second derivative of the preference cost with 
respect to decentralization is: 
0
2
2




P
       (13) 
  In reality, it is difficult to assess citizen‟s preference for local public services. Most of 
the time, individual‟s preferences will differ from one citizen to another, which make it more 
difficult to measure community‟s preference for a certain public service. Therefore, later in this 
study we will use the measures of local need for public services as the proxy for preferences. 
Although this proxy is not perfect as needs do not necessarily equal with preference (a  
community in need of a certain public service may no chose or prefer that local government 
provide another public service), but in this study we will assume that citizen will prefer to have 
public services that they needed the most.  
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The maximization problem 
Public service provision in a decentralized system has to take into account the tradeoff 
between increase in allocative efficiency from the better match to local preference and the loss of 
economies of scale in production associated with smaller size of government.  The optimal 
solution for this tradeoff is reached when the difference between gains of more efficient 
provision of public service (due to better match with local preference) and the cost rising from 
smaller production size is maximized (Oates 1972).9 
Following Oates‟ optimal solution, maximization of the social welfare function regarding 
the provision of health and education services can be written as the difference between the social 
value of the production of service V(q) and the resource costs to fulfill the demand for service 
RC(q): 
)()( qRCqVW        (14a) 
Let assume that the social value of the production of service V(q) is identical with the social 
value associated with the service  P(q). Since the preference cost is defined as the disutility, then 
P(q) takes a negative sign. Equation (14a) can be rewritten as: 
)()( qRCqPW        (14b) 
   ),(),(),(,( qeqCCerPW      (15) 
To maximize the social welfare function (15) is equivalent to minimizing the sum of 
preference costs and resource costs: 
   ),(),(),(,(minmax qeqCCerPW     (16) 
                                               
9 This “optimal” solution was achieved under some assumptions, such as government is welfare maximizing and 
possesses “perfect correspondence” or perfect knowledge of its citizen‟s taste. These assumptions are restrictive 
enough for the provision of a single public good, let alone for the production of multiple goods. 
38 
 
Where the first order condition to solve for β* that maximizes the social welfare function/ 
minimizes total cost is: 
 






 CPW
      (17) 
 Considering that decentralization reform in Indonesia has just started less than a decade 
ago, it is reasonable to assume that at the present decentralization has not arrived at its optimal 
level. From the condition of resource costs in equation (7), let assume that the present degree of 
decentralization is at βL <  β < β
max
 , such that .0



C
Similarly, from the condition of 
preference costs in equation (8)  let assume that degree of decentralization is at βL <  β < β
min, 
such that .0


P
C
 
The condition to minimize total preference and resources costs in equation (17) is: 
 



 CP
       (18) 
such that the benefit from lower preference cost is greater than the diseconomies of scale from 
decentralized service provision.  
Research shows that health spending in Indonesia seems to be determined mostly by 
other factors than local needs, so the services and infrastructure available do not fit the local 
preference.10  Therefore, condition (18) is plausible for the case of health service in Indonesia 
where benefits from increased allocative efficiency from decentralization may exceed the 
diseconomies of scale such that .0



W
 
                                               
10 Public Expenditure Review 2007 p. 59 (World Bank 2007) 
39 
 
For education sector, the present decentralization condition in Indonesia may not create 
diseconomies of scale considering that the size of population in most local governments is quite 
large.11  Therefore, we may expect that the loss of economies of scale due to smaller size of local 
government, 

C
, to be small and the benefit from lower preference cost to exceed 
diseconomies of scale for provision of education services. 
 As decentralization progresses, the number of local governments are likely to increase 
over time since citizens would prefer to be closer to their government. This is apparent for the 
case of Indonesia where number of municipalities nearly doubled since the beginning of 
decentralization in 2001. While proliferation brings potentially increases in  representation and 
thus  improve allocative efficiency by bringing government closer to the people, some observers 
also suggest that creation of new local government maybe the result of local elite‟s political 
ambitions (Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser 2005; Qibthiyyah 2008) . 
 The effect of increasing the number of local governments to social welfare in equation 
(17) is given by: 
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From the previous proposition, 

W
takes a positive sign. The relationship between 
decentralization and the number (or size) of sub-national government is: 
CN
N
i
N
ii
.2
1
1






      (20) 
which will also be positive under a certain condition. Therefore, under the following condition: 
                                               
11 With the population of 221 million people in 2004 (according to MOHA) and about 450 local governments, the 
average size of population for local governments in Indonesia is about 470,000; which is larger than average size of 
population for local governments in other countries (e.g., US, European countries). 
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minmax ;   LL  
equation (19) will be positive, such that creation of new local government improves social 
welfare. 
 Based on the previous framework, this study is set to test the following hypotheses: 
When decentralization is below its optimal level such that minmax ;   LL , then:   
1. Decentralization improves health and education service by providing services that better 
related to local needs. 
2. The creation of new local government (proliferation) at the current stage of decentralization 
improves health and education service delivery.  
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL TESTS 
 
 This study aims to evaluate the impact of policy changes (fiscal decentralization) in the 
provision of public goods, as reflected by the outcomes of public expenditure in health and 
education sector. For this purpose, we use a well established method for policy analysis/program 
evaluation: the Difference-in-difference (DID) method. This procedure is widely accepted 
because of its ability to isolate the difference a certain treatment (often in a form of policy 
implementation or passage of a law) brings, by comparing the before and after outputs for the 
affected group (the treatment group) to the before and after outputs of the untreated group 
(known as the control group). DID method builds on several assumptions (Wooldridge 2002), 
that are: 
- Treatment/intervention are random 
- Conditional on group fixed effects 
- Conditional on time 
The first assumption is the strongest of DID.  The unbiasedness of DID estimator requires 
that choice of treatment group does not systematically relate to other factors that affect the 
outcomes. Simply put, the changes in output over time should have been exactly the same for 
both groups if there is no intervention. The validity of DID estimation lies on this restrictive 
assumption; that there is no possible endogeneity of the treatment itself (Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan 2004).  
The choice of DID in this study is practical as the necessary assumptions and data   
requirements are generally fulfilled. First of all, the possibility of endogeneity of the treatment is 
minimized by the nature of decentralization reform and health and education policy in Indonesia. 
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Since the reform was launched nationwide in 2001, all local governments in Indonesia were 
subject to the same policy, eliminating the possibility of non randomness in treatment. Second, 
the choice of health and education outcomes observed correspond with the outcomes of the    
National Health and Education policies set by the Central Government, therefore eliminating the 
endogeneity problem that usually comes with health and education outcomes under decentralized 
policy (Qibthiyyah 2008). Lastly, since most of the outcome measures are calculated from the 
annual household survey (SUSENAS), this study will have enough observations to cover periods 
of pre and post decentralization as called by the DID method. 
In the case of Indonesia, as decentralization reform progressed, the number of local 
governments has increased substantially.  This proliferation/creation of new local government 
process is known in Indonesian language as pemekaran (literally: blossoming). Proliferation is 
observable throughout the country, where the number of local governments in Indonesia has 
almost doubled within 8 years of decentralization. With this development, any comprehensive 
evaluation of decentralization impacts has to take proliferation also into consideration. A general 
examination on decentralized service delivery will not suffice, as it is important also to examine 
the impact of proliferation in service delivery. 
This empirical section is divided into two parts to better answer the following research 
questions: 
- Does decentralization improve service delivery 
- Does decentralized local government improve responsiveness to local needs 
- Since decentralization resulted in creation of new local governments, how does 
proliferation policy affect service delivery 
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Methodology 
 
Evaluation of decentralization on health and education outcomes  
 This section builds on the work by Faguet (2004), using a modified Difference-in-
Difference method to isolate the impact that decentralization has made to the provision of public 
goods (through public expenditure) and to examine whether or not the changes are determined by 
indicators of local needs. Our empirical examination will answer the following questions:  
(i) Does decentralization expenditure improve health and education outputs? 
(ii) If the changes are significant, can they be explained by variation in local needs and 
local institutions? 
 
Following Faguet (2004), the empirical model for each sector is: 
 mtttmmmt DG   321 )(    (21) 
 
Where Gmt is municipality m measured outcome for each sector of interest for each year,  αm is 
vector of municipality dummies, δt is vector of year dummies, and (αm x Dt) is the interaction 
between municipality dummies and decentralization dummies, which take the values 0 before 
2001 and 1 post decentralization, and εmt is the error term. The empirical model does not exactly 
follow the standard DID configuration, hence the “modified” DID method. Since 
decentralization was implemented nationally at the same time (no municipalities were excluded 
from decentralization), there is no separation between “treated” and “control” group, instead the 
model focused on evaluation of “before” and “after” implementation of decentralization policy 
for the same group of municipalities. 
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In accordance to the assumptions of DID, the empirical model controls for the following: 
- Municipality dummy (αm) which captures all the characteristics of a municipal fixed in 
time. 
- Time dummy (δt) which captures year shocks and time specific characteristics. 
Meanwhile (αm x Dt) is the decentralization-interacted municipal effect, which captures 
municipal specific characteristics that previously did not exist before decentralization. This term 
will capture the effects of local institutions dynamics that always exist within the community but 
become more prominent with the reform. Any systematic changes in politics or economy that 
affect all municipalities in similar ways will be captured by year term δt, therefore the term β 
captures only the effects that are municipality specific.  
 The variables of interest to analyze the effect of decentralization are the coefficients of 
municipal dummies and decentralization interacted dummies (β1 and β2). Significantly different 
coefficients support the hypothesis that changes in policy (in this case is implementation of 
decentralization) contributes to the difference of measured outcomes of health and education 
sector.   
 The next tests are necessary to find whether the decentralization induced changes 
responded to local needs and local institutions. The three tests are: 
1. β1 = β2 means test. A t-test of whether the means of coefficients of αm and  (αm x Dt) for 
each sector are significantly different. Significance suggests that decentralization changed 
public service provision through the actions of local governments. 
2. β1m = β2m individual tests. This t-test checks whether αm and (αm x Dt)  are different for 
each municipality m for a given sector. Significance implies that decentralization changed 
the local public service provision pattern in a particular municipality. More municipalities 
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with significant changes give stronger evidence that decentralization changed the public 
goods provision pattern for the sector of interest. 
3. Using the values of  β1m and β2m , create new variables β1 and β2, respectively. The last 
test is to take the differences in municipal dummy coefficients on the LHS and estimate 
the model: 
mmmm DZS   12        (22) 
for education and health sector, separately. S is a scalar vector of the existing stock of 
public services at the beginning of decentralization, D is the ratio of own source revenue 
at initial period, and Z is a vector of institutional variables for each municipality m. With 
this approach, it is possible to see only the changes in public service due to 
decentralization and then explore its determinants.  
By construction, the dependent variable should only be explained by variables that change with 
decentralization. Then variables that do not vary between pre reform and post reform such as 
socio-economic, geographical and other similar factors will be excluded from the regression. 
Faguet (2004) assumes that stock of public services in each sector of interest, S, and other 
variables included in Z are constant over the period of study. Although it is less reasonable to 
assume they are constant, the limited data availability leaves no choice but to assume constant S 
and Z over time. We will use the initial year‟s ratio of own source revenue, D, as the third 
determinant of changes in public service outputs. With other determinants (Z and S) being a 
scalar, the use of initial D measures will maintain the consistency of data set in the regression.  
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The main coefficient of interest is ζ, which is interpreted as an indicator of the degree to 
which expenditure decision response to local need. The type of information used here as 
indicators of local needs are: 
- Penetration rates of public services, r. Examples of r are number of school or medical 
facility per village. The coefficient of ζ is expected to have negative sign when Sm is 
measured by the penetration rate r, suggesting that local governments under decentralized 
regime provide more service to municipalities with less stock of public services. 
- Condition/incidence that requires government intervention, k. Example for k is number of 
epidemics occurred per village. The coefficient for ζ is expected to have a positive sign 
when Sm is measured by the need indicator k, suggesting that local governments under 
decentralized regime provide more service to help municipalities in hardship. 
 The variable Z captured the institutional determinants of expenditure decisions.12 The 
coefficient η should explain the effect of institutional and civic pull into decentralized public 
service delivery decision. Many variables can be included into this category, such as the number 
of private enterprises, the number of civil/non government organization, information technology, 
etc. One may argue that in a district where economic activities are mainly conducted by private 
enterprises; local government will receive more pressure from local business to allocate 
expenditure in economic and welfare enhancing activities. Similarly, districts with more civil 
institutions/NGOs will be more likely to be accountable on how public expenditures should be 
spent.  
 In addition with the determinants of expenditure used in Faguet‟s study, we include the 
ratio of own source revenues to total local government revenues, Dm. This ratio is a widely used 
                                               
12 Faguet (2004) found surprising amounts of data available to capture institutional characteristics of local 
governments in Bolivia, such as: private sector, project planning, civil institutions, training and capacity building, 
and Information Technology. However, most of these data are not available for Indonesia. 
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measure of decentralization known as the “revenue decentralization index.” It measures local 
government dependency to resources transferred from the higher tier governments. In Indonesia, 
since the largest portion of local government revenue comes from unconditional 
intergovernmental transfer (Dana Alokasi Umum or DAU), it is more likely that local 
government would receive less pressure from citizens on the use of public funds. Estache and 
Sinha (1995), Bardhan and Mokherjee (2006) find that decentralization tends to expand service 
delivery levels when local governments are self-financing and have greater degrees of fiscal 
autonomy. Then revenue decentralization ratio is expected to have positive effect on changes in 
government expenditure. 
 
Table 6. Variables contributing to changes in service delivery 
 
Category Variables 
Local needs (S) 
- Service penetration rate 
 
 
- Disaster/hardship 
 
 
- Number of schools per village 
- Number of health centers, clinics per village 
- Number of medical workers per village 
- Number of epidemics per village 
Civic & social institution (Z1) 
- Civic institution 
 
- Social institution 
 
- Number of villages with LKMD (social & safety 
board) and LMD (consultative board) 
- Number of social foundations per village 
 
Economic (private) sector (Z2) 
- Private banking/credit 
union 
 
- Industry 
 
 
- Number of credit union per village 
- Number of co-op per village 
- Number of manufacturing industries per village 
- Number of technical training centers per village 
 
Local government capacity (D) - Ratio of own source revenue to total revenue 
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Evaluation of proliferation (pemekaran) on health and education outcomes 
While some observers claim that in general proliferation is an undesirable development to 
decentralization, proliferation has been an inevitable phenomenon in Indonesia. Since the 
number of municipalities nearly doubled compared to the number before decentralization, any 
study about the impact of decentralization has to take proliferation into consideration. Proper 
assessment of the impact of proliferation calls for intensive empirical examination. One way to 
evaluate the effect of proliferation is to compare the performance of the municipalities before 
and after being proliferated. The most comprehensive study to date on potential impact of 
proliferation on public service delivery performance in Indonesia is the study by Qibthiyyah 
(2008), which also use Difference-in-Difference estimation method.  
Following Qibthiyyah (2008), the empirical model for panel data regression for each 
sector is given by: 
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(24) 
Where t is the estimation period; Y = the measure of outcome; D
o is dummy for the 
originating/mother district; Dn is dummy for new local governments; DT  is the time (year) 
dummy,  Xi,t is set of other covariates that may relate to outcome; and the last term is error term. 
This estimation model controls for the following:   
- Group dummies (Do ; Dn ); to control for initial group characteristics 
- Time dummy (DT) ; to control for time trend that may affect outcomes for both groups 
Meanwhile,  
(Do x Σ Dot)  is the post event dummy for the originating local governments  
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(Dn x Σ Dnt) is the post event dummy for the new local governments  
The variables of interest to analyze the effect of proliferation are the coefficients of interaction 
term (α5 and α6). Significantly different from zero coefficients support the hypothesis that 
changes in policy (in this case, the proliferation policy) contributes to the difference of outcomes 
in proliferated and original local governments.  
 
Control and treatment groups 
Ideally, the difference between the treated and control groups is only the treatment itself. 
In this case, any differences between the two groups were caused only by proliferation and not 
because of differences in municipal characteristics and preferences. Considering that 
proliferation occurred in all parts of the country, we will assume that the treatment is random. In 
this study, treatment group consists of the proliferated municipalities (newly created municipals 
and the originating municipals), while the control or untreated group consists of municipalities 
that did not experience proliferation after decentralization. We will refer to this arrangement as 
the “full sample” analysis. However, we may expect that proliferation will have different effects 
to the newly created municipalities compared to the originating municipalities. Therefore, the 
treatment group will be distinguished into two sub-groups, the originating and the newly created 
municipalities. 
In reality, it is observable that proliferation is more prominent in certain regions in 
Indonesia than others, which brings the possibility of non-randomness in treatment. To deal with 
this possibility, we will further analyze the effect of proliferation only on the proliferated 
municipalities, with the newly created municipalities being the treated group and originating 
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municipalities as the control group. We will refer to this arrangement as the “restricted sample” 
analysis. 
 
Data 
The data used in this study is of Indonesian municipalities, which covers the period of 
before and after decentralization. The observation period spans from1994 to 2006, which will 
vary for each outcome measure due to data availability. The outcome indicators were calculated 
from the Household Survey (SUSENAS) while measures of local needs and stock of existing 
public service were calculated from the Village Potential Survey (PODES), both from the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). Meanwhile, the revenue decentralization ratio was calculated 
from budget realization data published by the Ministry of Finance.    
 
Before and after data 
While the duration of data available varies for each measure of outcome, the computation 
process of health and education outcomes for each municipality from before and after 
decentralization is quite challenging. As decentralization resulted in proliferation, the number of 
municipalities outside Jakarta increased substantially from 292 prior to decentralization to 434 in 
2006. Municipalities were split to create new ones, in some cases even the newly created 
municipalities have experienced splits themselves. Therefore, the size of jurisdiction of a 
municipality in 1994 most likely is different in 2006. To make matter more complicated, 
municipal identification codes used in BPS surveys may not be consistent from year to year.  
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Figure 1. Construction of before and after data 
 
 
In order to maintain consistency of before and after data, we use municipalities of year 
2006 as unit of observation. To reconstruct each of proliferated municipalities to its “before” 
decentralization entity, we took the following steps:  
- Identify the newly created municipalities and the originating municipalities from which 
they split.    
- Identify which sub-districts (kecamatan) of originating municipality to become part of 
the newly created municipality, and which one stayed with the original one. This requires 
matching the sub-districts in the originating municipality before the split with sub-
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districts in the new one (as stated in the Law governing the creation of each new 
municipality).  
- Calculate the “before” outcomes for the new and originating municipalities by extracting 
observations only from each corresponding sub-districts. 
 
Measuring health and education outcomes 
While the task of providing services has been delegated to the sub-national level, the   
central government is actively setting national standards for important sectors like health and 
education in order to ensure the quality of service nationwide.  
 
Table 7. National Policy in Health and Education 
 
Sector National Policy Expected Outcomes 
Education Mandatory basic education for all 
citizens starting at the age of 6 
years and up – 6 years of 
elementary school and 3 years of 
junior high school 
 
- Enrollment rate (elementary, 
junior high, by gender).  
- Dropout rate (elementary; junior 
high) 
- Mean years of schooling  
- Adult literacy rate (total; by 
gender) 
Health Pursuant of Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG):  
1. Reducing infant and 
children under 5 mortality  
 
- Infant mortality (IMR)  
- Children under 5 mortality 
(U5MR) 
- Vaccination coverage rate   
 2. Improve maternal health - Birth attended by trained health 
workers 
- Contraceptive prevalence rate 
 
 This study focuses on the analysis of the measure of outcomes from the ongoing national 
health and education programs. By using these uniform indicators, the possibility of regional 
characteristics bias is eliminated since all regions are subject to the same policy. Table 8 presents 
the summary statistics for health and education outcomes used in this study. Outcome indicators 
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are calculated from the Household Survey (SUSENAS) while stock of public goods are 
calculated from the Village Potential Survey (PODES).     
 
Table 8. Summary statistics of health and education outcomes 
 
Outcomes Data avail. Obs. Mean Std dev. Min Max 
Health 
      
Infant Mortality Rate  1994-2006  
              
4,255  0.043 0.030 0.01 0.30 
Under 5 Mortality Rate  1996-2006  
              
4,113  0.035 0.041 0.00 0.40 
Life expectancy at birth  1994-2006  
              
3,816  66.861 6.627 28.50 75.10 
Labor assisted by medical 
worker  1994-2006  
              
5,311  61.739 25.224 0.00 100.00 
Health service utilization rate  1994-2006  
              
5,320  52.859 17.148 0.00 100.00 
Vaccination coverage: DPT  1995-2006*  
              
3,374  40.928 19.919 0.00 100.00 
Vaccination coverage: Polio  1995-2006*  
              
3,374  44.658 19.516 0.00 100.00 
Contraceptive prevalence rate  1994-2006  
              
5,323  50.847 15.452 0.00 91.81 
       
Education 
      
Adult literacy rate  1994-2004  
            
4,457  86.076 12.166 15.74 100.00 
Adult literacy rate (female)  1994-2004  
              
4,457  81.799 14.135 8.33 100.00 
Mean years of schooling  1994-2006  
              
5,323  6.687 0.999 3.68 10.88 
Net enrollment rate middle 
school  1994-2006  
              
5,325  57.155 16.540 0.00 100.00 
Net enrollment rate middle 
school (female)  1994-2006  
              
5,325  57.948 17.746 0.00 100.00 
Net enrollment rate high 
school   1994-2006  
              
5,322  36.654 18.022 0.00 92.04 
Net enrollment rate high 
school (female)  1994-2006  
              
5,318  37.031 18.985 0.00 100.00 
Dropout rate primary school  1994-2006  
              
5,323  1.831 1.744 0.00 20.18 
Dropout rate middle school  1994-2006  
              
5,312  4.730 5.112 0.00 100.00 
Dropout rate high school  1994-2006  
              
5,249  10.901 10.066 0.00 100.00 
 
Note: * vaccination coverage data available from 1994-1999, 2004-2006   
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Infant mortality rate (IMR), Under 5 Mortality Rate (U5MR), Life Expectancy at Birth 
These three outcome measures are among the most commonly used indicators to measure 
performance of the health sector. The variables required to calculate these three indicators are: 
number of infants that died before the age of 1 year, number of infants surviving, and number of 
live births. These household level data are then aggregated to the municipal level and further 
processed with MORTPAK, software designed by the United Nations to compute mortality and 
fertility indicators13. 
The infant mortality rate (IMR) is defined as number of infant deaths per 1000 live births.  
Figure 2 presents the average annual IMR for proliferated and non proliferated municipalities. 
On average, IMR rate is lower for non proliferated local governments although the average 
seems to converge over time. The overall IMR itself shows downward trend, as IMR rate was 
down from above 50 in the 1994 to below 40 in 2006.  
 
                                               
13 The method to estimating mortality and fertility from survey data was developed by Brass (1975), which is very 
useful for countries with limited data on mortality. For Indonesia, the estimation method used is the Trussel variant 
of Brass estimation, which correspondence to West mortality model of Coale-Demeny regional model life table. For 
technicality of the calculation, see UN‟s Manual for Indirect Demographic Estimation (1987). 
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Figure 2. Infant mortality rate 
  
 While decentralized health service delivery resulted in lower U5MR for the last few 
years, the distribution of child care related health services throughout the country still needs 
improvement. As presented in Figure 3, the proliferated municipalities U5MR on average are 
higher by 30 deaths than the non proliferated ones, indicating uneven health service distribution 
within the country. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
In
fa
n
t m
o
rt
a
lit
y 
ra
te
Proliferated LGs
Non proliferated LGs
56 
 
 
Figure 3. Under 5 mortality rate 
 
 
Life expectancy at birth is the average years a newborn is expected to live if present 
mortality rate continues to apply, which reflects the overall mortality level of population. Figure 
4 shows increasing improvement in LEAB since 1994. While the pattern is erratic for the 
proliferated municipalities (both new and originating), the number is consistently improve for the 
non-proliferated ones. Similar with IMR, the LEAB also converging and in 2006 the number is 
similar for all groups.   
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Figure 4. Life expectancy at birth (years) 
 
Vaccination coverage (DPT & Polio)  
WHO listed measles vaccination coverage among the outcomes of MDG related health 
policy, unfortunately data for measles vaccination in Indonesia is very limited. Data obtained 
from Ministry of Health‟s Directorate General of Disease Control only have measles vaccination 
coverage by municipality for year 2001-2004. Given the short period of data availability, it is not 
feasible to use measles vaccination coverage in this study.   
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Figure 5. Vaccination coverage, DPT 
 
SUSENAS surveys for coverage of different vaccination programs, but DPT (Diphtheria 
– Pertussis – Tetanus) and Polio vaccinations are the ones mostly surveyed throughout 
observation period. Since the Indonesian Pediatric Association strongly recommended 
vaccination against DPT and Polio for infants (among other necessary vaccines), then it is 
appropriate to use DPT and Polio vaccination coverage as health outcomes14.    
                                               
14 The Indonesian Pediatric Association timeline for vaccination scheduled for five doses of DPT and Polio vaccines 
to be completed by age of 5. Therefore, the definition of “DPT and Polio vaccination coverage” in Indonesia should 
be the number of children under 5 years with five doses of DPT and Polio vaccines. This is different with WHO‟s 
definition, where WHO measures coverage as number of children with three doses of vaccines. In this study, we will 
use WHO‟s definition to conform with internationally used health indicator.   
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Figure 6. Vaccination coverage, Polio 
 
Health service utilization rate 
While it is relatively easy to monitor the number physical health facilities (including 
personnel) available to general population, the number of health facilities does not necessarily 
correspondence with the actual utilization rate of health services. This is particularly true for a 
country like Indonesia with a vast territory and unevenly distributed population which 
historically has resulted in an unequal (and inefficient) allocation of available health resources 
(World Bank 2007).  
To be able to enjoy health services, a patient has to consider not only the physical 
distance to existing facilities but also the out of pocket cost incurred in doing so. With no 
national health plan available and limited participation in private health insurance schemes, out 
of pocket costs of health service are likely to be the deciding factor for seeking treatment. 
Improvement in health service utilization rates implies that there are more health facilities 
available, and most importantly, improvement in accessibility to affordable health services.  
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Figure 7. Health service utilization rate 
 
To calculate utilization rate, we use number of people in need of medical treatment (i.e., 
had health complaints enough to disrupt their daily activities) who seek treatment at hospitals, 
private clinics, community health clinics (Puskesmas) or consult with a medical personnel.  
 
Labor assisted by a skilled health worker 
  Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey (IDHS) 2002 reported a high Mortality 
Maternity Rate (MMR) of 307 per 100,000 live births. This number apparently has not changed 
over time and fares poorly compared with other East Asian countries15. Having a skilled health 
worker to assist with labor undoubtedly will lower MMR and potentially also lower infant 
mortality.  
                                               
15 World Bank in Public Expenditure Review (2007) even calls Indonesia as a “true regional outlier” regarding 
MMR, since it is more than 6 times higher than China, 10 and 15 times higher than Thailand and Malaysia. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Se
rv
ic
e
 u
ti
liz
at
io
n
 r
a
te
Proliferated LGs
Non proliferated LGs
61 
 
 The role of traditional midwives (dukun bayi) to deliver babies is still significant in some 
regions of Indonesia. While the Government has launched training programs to educate these 
traditional midwives (dukun terlatih), the Household Survey data does not differentiate between 
labors assisted by trained and untrained dukun bayi. Thus the definition of “skilled health 
workers” used in this study comprises only of doctors, midwives, or paramedics.  
 
 
Figure 8. Labor attended by medical worker 
 
Contraceptive prevalence rate  
 Before decentralization, Indonesia had been acclaimed for its success with the Family 
Planning program (Keluarga Berencana) that in 1989 it received United Nation Population 
Award. As contraceptive prevalence rate is one of outcomes from MDG, it is only fitting to also 
use it as a measure of health sector performance.  
 As shown in Figure 9, in general, the contraceptive prevalence rate shows increasing 
trend over the period of observation. The non proliferated municipalities experience a sudden 
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drop from 52% to 48% in year 2001, but continue to increase afterwards.  Meanwhile, the 
proliferated municipalities‟ prevalence rate shows different pattern with the proliferated ones. 
The average annual rate for the proliferated increase in the beginning of observation, then 
decline from 52% to 48% from 1997-2001. This decline was likely due to the relative increase of 
out of pocket cost of contraceptive after the financial crisis.  
 
 
Figure 9. Contraceptive prevalance rate 
 
Adult/Female Literacy Rate 
 Adult literacy rate is one of the most common indicators used to assess the quality of 
education services and standard of living in general. The adult literacy rate is defined as the 
percentages of people aged 15 and older who can, with understanding, both read and write a 
short, simple statement related to their everyday life. Figure10 shows that adult literacy rate is 
increasing nationally, with the disparity between proliferated and non proliferated municipalities 
lessening over time.  
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Figure 10. Adult literacy rate 
 
While the overall adult literacy rate shows improvement after decentralization, it is 
important to find out whether female education also improved with decentralization.  The 
calculated female literacy rates in Figure 11 show that the female literacy rate is slightly lower 
from the overall rate. By year 2004, the female literacy rate reached 85% and 87% for the 
proliferated and non proliferated ones, respectively, which is only 4% less than the overall 
literacy rate for each group. These figures show improvement in education services after 
decentralization, and more specifically improvement in gender-related equality of education.   
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Figure 11. Female adult literacy rate 
 
Net enrollment rate (middle school, high school, overall, female) 
National education policy mandates all children age 7-15 years to have 6 years of primary 
school and 3 years of middle school. Pursuing this national policy has significantly improved 
enrollment, especially for primary school. The World Bank reported that gross enrollment rate 
for primary school in 2005 was 107.1% while net enrollment rate reached 93.2% for primary 
school16. Given the success in improving enrollment rates for primary education, the challenge to 
Indonesia education policy is to improve enrolment rates for the next level of education 
(secondary and tertiary). Therefore, this study will examine the enrollment rate for secondary 
education (junior and high school) as the education outcomes of interest. 
Net enrollment rate for secondary education computes the number of children age 12-15 
and 15-17 years who at the time of survey were attending junior and high school, respectively. 
                                               
16 As reported in Public Expenditure Review 2007, p. 30 
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We also examine female net enrollment rates for both education levels, as it is important to find 
out whether or not there is gender equality in education participation.  
Figure 12 presents the net enrollment rate for junior high, while Figure 13 presents the 
female enrollment rate for junior high school. The enrollment rate shows siginificant increase 
from 45% for proliferated and 50% for non proliferated municipalities in 1994 to around 65% in 
2006. Unlike other indicators, there is little disparity between the proliferated and non 
proliferated groups, and at the end of the observation period both groups reached similar 
enrollment rates. The calculated female net enrollment rate for junior high school is very similar 
to the overall rate of enrolment, indicating that there is less discrimination in female education.   
The net enrollment rate for high school is much lower than that of junior high, which 
only reached 45% in 2006. Figure 14 reports that at the beginning of observation period, only 
25% and 33% of children aged 16-18 enrolled in high school in proliferated and non proliferated 
municipalities, respectively.  The female high school enrollment rate is very similar to the overall 
number as presented in Figure 15, again indicated that there is improvement in equality of 
education opportunity for women. The relatively low net enrollment rates presented here show 
there is immediate need for local governments to extend resources allocated to primary education 
to provision of the next education level.  
We observe convergence in net enrollment rates for junior high school and high school 
among both groups, as by the end of observation period both proliferated and non proliferated 
groups reached similar enrollment rates.  This indicates that proliferated municipalities put much 
effort into improving education services delivery to catch up with their non proliferated 
counterparts. 
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Figure 12. Junior high school net enrollment rate 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Female net enrollment rate (Junior high school) 
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Figure 14. High school net enrollment rate 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Female net enrollment rate (high school) 
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Dropout rate (primary, middle, high school) 
While enrollment rate shows how many children are enrolled at any level of education, 
from dropout rate we will find the percentage of children that stay in school during the year of 
survey. This indicator calculated as the percentage of children at the corresponding school ages 
that are enrolled but no longer attended school. 
Consistent with of mandatory primary education, the dropout rate for primary education 
is relatively low. Figure 16 shows that dropout rate was less than 2.75% in 1994, which decrease 
to only 1.5% in 2006. The numbers are relatively similar for proliferated and non proliferated 
municipalities. Combined with the high enrollment rate for primary education, these figures 
show the success of pursuing basic (primary) education for children in Indonesia. 
 
 
Figure 16. Primary school dropout rate 
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For junior high school, the dropout rate is significantly higher than that for primary 
school. Interestingly, Figure 17 shows some unlikely patterns for junior high dropout rate. 
Following the financial crisis of 1997 and continue to year 2001, dropout rate falls by around 3% 
for both proliferated and non proliferated municipalities. These changes are unexplainable, as 
one would expect that dropout rate would increase after the crisis with the increase of out of 
pocket education costs as well as opportunity cost of children attending school. At the end of 
observation period, the  proliferated municipalities experienced improvement from 6.5% dropout 
rate in 1994 to 3.5% in 2006, while the proliferated municipalities stay relatively stable with 4% 
dropout rate over the period. 
 
 
Figure 17. Junior high school dropout rate 
 
 The dropout rates for high school are significantly higher than for the others, which 
started with 9% for non proliferated and 13% for the proliferated municipalities. Figure 18 also 
shows that there are unexplained drops starting in 1999 and continuing to year 2001, changes 
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that somewhat similar to that of junior high school. However, there is no significant 
improvement in high school dropout rate, as the number fluctuated but ended at about the same 
rate with 1994. Since data shows that most children in Indonesia have enjoy the 6 years of 
primary education, the focus need to be shifted to the provision of secondary (junior high and 
high school) education. 
 
Mean years of schooling 
Mean years of schooling is the estimated average of completed schooling for the total 
population aged 15 or over who has any status of educational attainment.  Figure 19 shows that 
on average people get about 6 years of education even before decentralization, which supports 
the general recommendation of shifting attention to secondary education. There is a sudden drop 
for year 2001 that probably better to be treated as an outlier, as there is no logical explanation for 
this drop. At the end of observation, the average mean years of schooling changes only by 0.5 
year for both group. With the implementation of 9 years mandatory education, it is likely that in 
the next few years the number will improve significantly. 
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Figure 18. High school dropout rate 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Mean years of schooling 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 This chapter presents the results from empirical tests described in the previous section. 
The first and second set of tests are designed to examine whether decentralization improves 
health and education outcomes, while the third set of test is designed to explore whether changes 
in service outcomes are related to measures of local government needs. The last set of test will 
further answer the question whether or not “advance” in decentralization (local government‟s 
proliferation to create new municipalities) affected the quality/performance of service delivery. 
 
General examination of decentralized health and education outcomes 
 Table 9 shows the results from the first test, β1 = β2 means test. This table reports whether 
or not means of municipal dummies are significantly different from the means of 
decentralization interacted dummies for all education outcomes. However, the direction of the 
change is determined by the value of the post decentralization dummy (β2). To better explain the 
effect of decentralization on service outcomes, the result tables will also provide the direction of 
changes brought by the decentralized regime. Results of the test show that on average most 
education outcomes change significantly after decentralization. The test indicates significant 
improvements in national average years of schooling, adult literacy rate, female literacy rate, and 
lower high school dropout rates.  
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Table 9.  Education outcomes mean test ( β1 = β2 ) 
 
Outcome Coefficient Mean Std. error T-stat # obs 
      
Adult literacy rate B1 -8.816 0.503 -16.513
*** 417 
B2 1.570 0.245 
  
Female adult literacy rate B1 -9.867 0.598 -13.986
*** 417 
B2 0.452 0.276 
  
Years of schooling B1 0.286 0.049 3.651
*** 423 
B2 0.054 0.019 
  Net enrolment rate: Middle 
school 
B1 4.345 0.688 8.844*** 423 
B2 -3.894 0.405 
  Female net enrolment rate: 
Middle school 
B1 7.822 0.726 18.283*** 423 
B2 -10.975 0.462 
  Net enrolment rate: High 
school 
B1 12.596 0.794 28.792*** 423 
B2 -15.804 0.393 
  Female net enrolment rate: 
High school 
B1 12.709 0.812 29.424*** 423 
B2 -17.333 0.429 
  
Dropout rate: Primary school B1 0.619 0.066 2.1247
** 423 
B2 0.393 0.049 
  
Dropout rate: Middle school B1 0.973 0.172 -0.534 423 
B2 1.133 0.167 
  
Dropout rate: High school B1 0.566 0.322 4.111
*** 422 
B2 -1.989 0.350 
   
Note: *** statistically significant at 1%   ** at 5%    * at 10% 
  
For the health sector, the results presented in Table 10 also show significant changes on 
national health outcomes under decentralized regime. Unfortunately, decentralization brings 
mixed changes to measured health outcomes. The results show improvement of mortality rates 
with significant declines in infant, under 5 mortality rates as well as longer life expectancy. But 
some decentralized health services seem to be less available, as percentage of labor assisted by 
medical workers, vaccination coverage, and number of active contraceptive users show declining 
trends.   
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Table 10.  Health outcomes mean test ( β1 = β2 ) 
 
Outcomes Coefficient Mean Std. error T-stat # obs 
Infant mortality rate B1 0.006 0.001 8.592
*** 412 
B2 -0.013 0.001 
  
Under 5 mortality rate B1 -0.033 0.002 -8.096
*** 409 
B2 -0.006 0.002 
  
Life expectancy after birth B1 -0.875 0.276 -12.224
*** 407 
B2 4.810 0.238 
  
Labor assisted by medical workers B1 26.034 1.060 32.905
*** 422 
B2 -20.971 0.626 
  
Service utility rate B1 24.266 0.469 42.925
*** 423 
B2 -6.440 0.427 
  
Vaccination coverage: DPT B1 19.161 0.727 20.708
*** 420 
B2 -4.085 0.508 
  
Vaccination coverage: Polio B1 12.595 0.689 11.345
*** 420 
B2 0.230 0.506 
  
Contraceptive prevalence rate B1 27.964 0.654 48.639
*** 423 
B2 -8.063 0.323 
   
Note: *** statistically significant at 1%   ** at 5%    * at 10% 
 
The second test is the β1m = β2m individual test for each municipality. This F-test 
examines whether αm and α
*
m are significantly different for each municipality for a given sector. 
The statistically different result implies that there is significant difference between outcomes in 
each municipality from before and after decentralization. Similar to the previous test, further 
investigation is required to find out whether or not decentralization brings favorable changes to 
health and education service outcomes. 
Table 11 presents the number of municipalities experiencing significant change and the 
direction of change itself. In general, more than 50% municipalities experience significant 
changes in education outcomes after decentralization. Results show significant improvement for 
adult literacy rates, dropout rates, and mean years of schooling. However, more municipalities 
experience declining trend on middle and high school enrollment rate, especially for female 
75 
 
students. These facts emphasize the importance of shifting some of the resources to improve 
secondary education in order to ensure continuity of education in Indonesia. 
 
Table 11. Test 2: β1m = β2m municipal test for education sector 
 
Measured outcomes Significant changes Direction of change 
  Total % % improved % declined 
Net Enrollment Rate Middle School 262 59.28 59.16 40.84 
Net Enrollment Rate Middle School 
(Female) 232 52.49 18.97 81.03 
Net Enrollment Rate High School 138 31.22 22.46 77.54 
Net Enrollment Rate High School (Female) 155 35.07 18.06 81.94 
Adult Literacy Rate 216 52.30 68.98 31.02 
Adult Literacy Rate (Female) 220 52.26 54.55 45.45 
Dropout Rate (Primary) 380 85.97 18.42 81.58 
Dropout Rate (Middle school) 413 93.44 21.07 78.93 
Dropout Rate (High school) 408 92.31 59.56 40.44 
Mean years of schooling 225 50.90 74.67 25.33 
 
The result for similar test for health outcomes is presented in Table 12. Most 
municipalities experience significant changes in health outcomes, although the direction of 
change is not entirely desirable. Similar to the result from the previous mean test, it is also 
observable that more municipalities experience improvement in mortality related measures, as 
Under 5 Mortality Rate declines and life expectancy is longer. Aside from mortality-related 
measures, in general most municipalities only see improvement in contraceptive prevalence rate 
while more municipalities experience declining health service utilization after decentralization.  
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Table 12. Test 2: β1m = β2m individual tests for health outcomes 
 
Measured outcomes Significant changes Direction of change 
 
Total % % improved % declined 
Infant mortality rate 392 88.69 46.43 53.57 
Under 5 mortality rate 322 78.73 75.47 24.53 
Life expectancy at birth 337 82.80 68.84 31.16 
Service utilization rate 126 28.51 19.84 80.16 
Labor assisted by medical workers 122 27.60 27.87 72.13 
Immunization rate (DPT) 243 57.86 27.16 72.84 
Immunization rate (Polio) 306 72.86 34.64 65.36 
Contraceptive prevalence rate 56 12.67 46.43 53.57 
 
 The third test is to explore the determinants of the difference of municipal dummy 
variables (β1 - β2); that is, what are the factors contributing to changes in health and education 
outcomes. Decentralization theory posits that decentralized service delivery will better answer 
local needs, and the next test is to find the relationship between changes in service outcomes to 
proxy of local needs, pressure from local civic, social and economic institutions, and local 
governments own fiscal capacity.  
Table 13 presents the determinants of changes in education outcomes. Following the 
proposition in Faguet‟s study (2004), the negative sign on the impact of service penetration rate 
implies that decentralized local governments make appropriate decision by allocating more 
resources to municipalities with less education service  (average number of school per village), 
and less to municipalities that already enjoy higher education service. Although the results are 
significant only for mean years schooling and high school enrollment rate, they show evidence 
that education services responded to the variable of local needs. 
Other possible contributing factors are the presence of civic and social institutions and 
economic sector lead by privately-owned enterprises. The results show that civic and social 
institutions have positive effect on education outcomes, as the presence of village civic 
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institutions are positively related to higher enrollment rates and lower dropout rates. 
Municipalities with more social organization unexpectedly have lower mean years of schooling, 
which also translated into lower adult literacy rates. The presence of a strong private sector 
economy in general does not have strong effects to education outcomes, as the results are mostly 
not significant except for a positive effect on high school enrollment and adult literacy. 
 
Table 13. Determinants of changes in education outcomes (β1 - β2) 
 
Determinant Years 
school 
Adult literacy 
Enrollment 
Mid School 
Enrollment 
High School Dropout rate 
All Female All Female All Female Prim Mid Hi 
Service penetration 
rate:  (average per 
village) 
          Primary school n/s n/s n/s 
    
n/s 
  Middle school n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
   
n/s 
 High school (-) n/s n/s 
  
(-) (-) 
  
n/s 
           Civic/social institutions: 
          Village social & safety 
board (LKMD) n/s n/s n/s (+) n/s (+) (+) (-) (-) (-) 
Village consultative 
board (LMD) n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s (-) n/s 
Social/charitable 
organization (-) (-) (-) n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
           Economic/ private 
sector: 
          Community credit union n/s (+) (+) n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
Cooperative n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s (+) (+) n/s n/s n/s 
Manufacturing industry n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
Technical education 
centers n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
           Local fiscal capacity 
          Own source revenue 
share (+) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
            
Note: n/s not significant 
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Introducing the revenue decentralization ratio as a possible determinant of changes in 
service delivery proves to have positive and significant effect.  As revenue decentralization ratio 
is an indicator of municipal finances dependency to central government transfer, it is expected 
that local governments with less dependency on transfers will likely to have more control of their 
budget decision. The positive sign indicates that decentralization increases education expenditure 
for municipalities with higher ability to raise their own source revenue, thus resulting in better 
service provision and better education outcomes. The results show that fiscal capacity is 
negatively related to changes in education outcomes, that municipality with higher fiscal 
capacity does not necessarily allocate more resources for education sector. This result should be 
interpreted carefully; that while local governments with higher fiscal capacity may not increase 
their resource allocation to education services, they may choose to allocate more resources to 
other types of public services. 
 Unlike the education sector, it seems that decentralized resource allocation for health 
sector does not respond to measures of local needs. As presented in Table 14, the results show 
that after decentralization, local governments allocate more resources to municipalities that 
already enjoy higher health services (i.e., have higher average number of health centers and 
health workers) instead of investing more to municipalities that presently lacking of health 
services. We also introduced the average number of epidemic occurred within a year as another 
measure of local needs, but it does not have statistically significant effect to health outcomes. 
Similar to the results for the education sector, the presence of civic, social institutions and 
private sector are positively related to health outcomes. Municipalities with more social 
organizations have higher service utilization rate, vaccination coverage and contraception usage, 
while an active private sector economy lead to lower mortality measures. Contradictory with the 
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case of the education sector, the results show that some health indicators are positively related 
with fiscal capacity. This indicates that municipalities with higher fiscal capacity increase their 
health expenditure, thus contributing to improve service provision resulted better health 
outcomes.  
 
Table 14. Determinants of changes in health outcomes (β1 - β2) 
 
 Determinant 
IMR U5MR LEAB 
Service 
Utility  
Assisted 
labor DPT  Polio  
Contra-
ceptive 
Service penetration rate:  
(average per village) 
      Health center/hospitals n/s n/s n/s (+) n/s n/s n/s n/s 
Clinics n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
Doctors (+) n/s n/s n/s (-) n/s n/s n/s 
Dentists n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
Paramedics n/s n/s n/s n/s (+) n/s n/s n/s 
Midwives n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
         Service needs:  
(average per village) 
        Epidemic n/s n/s + n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
         Civic/social institutions: 
        Village social & safety board 
(LKMD) n/s n/s n/s n/s (+) n/s n/s n/s 
Village consultative board 
(LMD) n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
Social/charitable organization n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s (-) (-) (+) 
         Economic private sector: 
        Community credit union (-) (+) n/s n/s n/s n/s (-) n/s 
Cooperative n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
Manufacturing industry n/s (+) n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s (+) 
Technical education centers n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s n/s 
         Local fiscal capacity: 
        Own source revenue share (-) (+) (-) n/s (+) (-) (-) n/s 
          
Note: n/s not significant 
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Effects of proliferation on health and education outcomes 
Over time, decentralization in Indonesia resulted in the creation of a significant number 
of new local governments. This development is likely to affect local governments‟ decision on 
resource allocation, thus it is important to take proliferation into account when examining the 
outcomes of decentralization. Table 15 reports the impact of proliferation (the coefficients of the 
interaction term; α5 and α6) to service delivery education sector for full sample and restricted 
sample analysis. Significantly different than zero coefficients support the hypothesis that change 
in policy (in this case, the proliferation policy) contributes to the difference in education 
outcomes. 
 
Table 15. Effect of proliferation to education service delivery 
 
Outcome Full sample Restricted sample 
  New Originating New 
Mean years of schooling + + n/s 
Adult literacy rate n/s n/s n/s 
Female adult literacy rate n/s n/s n/s 
Net enrolment rate Middle school + + n/s 
Net enrolment rate Middle school 
(Female) 
+ + n/s 
Net enrolment rate High school + + n/s 
Net enrolment rate High school 
(Female) 
+ + n/s 
Dropout rate: Primary school - - n/s 
Dropout rate: Middle school - - n/s 
Dropout rate: High school - n/s n/s 
 
Note: n/s not significant 
 
  
 The education sector appears to have highly benefited from proliferation, as the full 
sample test results show the desirable effect to all education outcomes. Proliferated local 
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governments have higher enrollment rates, longer years of schooling and lower dropout rates 
after being proliferated. These results are highly significant and consistent for different 
estimation methods. It is possible that with creation of new local governments, both new and 
originating municipalities now managed their education system more efficiently and effectively. 
Since proliferation brings desirable changes in education outcomes to both new and originating 
municipalities, it also shows that creation of new local governments does not resulted in 
redistributing resources away from the originating municipalities.  
 More specific analysis to the restricted sample group shows that there are no significant 
differences in effect of proliferation to newly created municipalities compared to the originating 
ones.  The results from restricted sample analysis agree with the results from full sample 
analysis, where we observe that proliferation affected both newly created and originating 
municipalities in similar ways.      
 
Table 16. Effect of proliferation to health outcomes  
 
 Full sample Restricted sample 
  New Originating New 
Infant mortality rate - - - 
Under 5 mortality rate - - - 
Life expectancy + + + 
Labor assisted by medical worker - + - 
Service utility rate - - n/s 
Vaccination coverage: DPT - - n/s 
Vaccination coverage: Polio - - n/s 
Contraceptive prevalence rate n/s + - 
 
Note: n/s not significant 
 
On the other hand, health outcomes do not improve significantly for proliferated local 
governments as shown on Table 16. Mortality related measures experience significant 
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improvement, as mortality rates decline and life expectancy is longer for both new and 
originating municipalities while service utilization rate and vaccination coverage are lower for 
proliferated municipalities. In general, this result provides similar result with the previous tests 
on general decentralization impact. 
The results from restricted sample analysis show similar results to the full sample 
analysis results. We observe that after being separated from its originating municipalities, newly 
created municipalities also experience improvement in mortality measures. As for measures of 
health service utilization (labor assisted by medical workers, contraceptive prevalence rate), the 
newly created municipalities are worse off after being proliferated. 
Complete estimations of health and education performance in proliferated municipalities 
are presented in Appendix D. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of decentralization reform to health and 
education service delivery in Indonesia. Previously one of the most centralized countries in the 
world, Indonesia has moved to be one of the most decentralized one in relatively short period 
since the beginning of decentralization known as the “Big Bang” in 2001. With decentralization 
in place, provinces and municipalities demanded more autonomy which resulted in the creation 
of new jurisdictions. From 26 provinces and 313 municipalities in 1999, the number of 
jurisdictions grew to 33 provinces with 440 municipalities in 2004.   
There exists a substantial amount of literature on Indonesia, which mainly focuses on the 
fiscal design of decentralization such as expenditure and revenue assignments and also the 
design of the intergovernmental transfer system. However, after almost a decade since the 
reform, there is only limited empirical evidence on the relationship between decentralization and 
outcomes of development sectors. This study aims to fill the gap in the literature by examining 
whether or not decentralization improved allocative efficiency of government expenditures in the 
health and education sectors by matching public services with local need and preferences. As 
decentralization resulted in proliferation, this study also analyzes the effect of local government 
creation on health and education outcomes. 
 
Education 
The results in this study show significant changes in education outcomes under the 
decentralized regime. In general, more than 50% of municipalities experiencing improvements in 
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education outcomes, such in literacy rates (overall and female), years of schooling, and dropout 
rates for primary and secondary education. However, only 46% of municipalities had 
improvements in enrollment rates for junior high school, while only 33% of municipalities 
improve their enrollment rate for high school. The numbers for female enrollment rate are even 
lower, where only 35% improves for junior high and 23% for high school. 
Since the beginning of decentralization, the government has launched a “9 years 
Mandatory Education” program for children aged 6 to 15 to get at least 9 years of education in 
primary and junior high school. In the past years, the government has successfully improved 
access to primary education, as enrollment rate for primary education has reached almost 100%. 
The results of the study indicate that it is time for the government  to switch  priority to 
secondary education in order to ensure continuation of education, that by providing accessible 
secondary education will encourage children to continue schooling once the finished with 
primary education.  
The next exercise explores the determinants of changes in education outcomes, as   
decentralization is expected to improve allocative efficiency by bringing services that better 
respond to local needs. The negative sign on the impact of service penetration rate implies that 
after decentralization, local governments made the appropriate decisions by allocating more 
resources to municipalities with less education service (lower average number of school per 
village), and less to municipalities that already enjoy higher education service, thus responded to 
variable of local needs. 
With decentralization, government is expected to become more accountable in response 
to their citizen increased political participation. Citizen participation may increase in areas with 
active civic and social institutions, as well as areas with strong economic sector lead by private 
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enterprises. These factors may influence government decision in allocating resources for service 
delivery. The result of the exercise show that   the presence of village civic institutions positively 
related to higher enrollment rate and lower dropout rate, although municipalities with more 
social organization unexpectedly have lower mean years of schooling, which also translated to 
lower adult literacy rates. The presence of private sector economy in general does not have 
strong effect to education outcomes, as the results are mostly not significant except for positive 
effect on high school enrollment and adult literacy.  
Other factor that may influence government decision in providing service is their fiscal 
capacity, that local government with less dependency to transfer have more freedom in allocating 
their budget. One may expect that local governments with higher own source revenue will 
allocate their resources to improving important sector such as education, but the result shows 
otherwise. Fiscal capacity is negatively related to changes in education outcomes; thus, 
municipalities with higher capacity do not necessarily allocate more resources to the education 
sector. 
 
Health 
 Unlike the education sector, decentralization does not bring improvement in health 
service delivery for most municipalities in Indonesia. There is strong significant improvement 
for majority of municipalities in mortality related measures such as Under 5 Mortality Rate 
(U5MR) and life expectancy at birth, but most municipalities experience declining usage of 
health facilities (physical facilities and personnel). Indicators such as health service utilization 
rate, labor attended by medical workers, immunization coverage and contraceptive usage are 
worsen in most municipalities after decentralization. The results are contradictory; since 
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improvements in mortality-related measures indicate better health care in general but service 
utilization measures are worsen after decentralization.  
 One possible explanation for the contradictory results in health service delivery is the 
uneven distribution of health services. While not all municipalities could build their own 
hospital, but there should be more community health clinic (Puskesmas), ancillary health clinic 
or mobile clinic available at the municipal level. It is likely that decentralization does not 
improve the distribution of health services, which people have to travel to the neighboring 
districts to enjoy health care service. These results express the need of health service reform in 
Indonesia to improve access to health services. 
   The uneven distribution of health services is more visible when we examine the 
determinants of changes in health outcomes. Result shows that after decentralization, the 
municipalities that already enjoy higher health services (i.e., have higher average number of 
health centers and health workers) allocate more resources to health sector compared to those 
municipalities that presently lacking of health services. Another measure of local needs, average 
number of epidemic occurred within a year, does not have statistically significant effect to health 
outcomes. 
Similar to the results to education sector, the presence of civic, social institutions and 
private sector are positively related to health outcomes. Municipalities with more social 
organizations have higher service utilization rate, vaccination coverage and contraception usage, 
while active private sector economy lead to lower mortality measures. Contradictory with the 
case of education sector, results show that some health indicators are positively related with 
fiscal capacity. This indicates that municipalities with higher fiscal capacity increase their health 
expenditure, thus contributing to better service provision and better health outcomes. However, 
87 
 
this add to unequal distribution in health service, as richer municipalities (i.e., higher own source 
revenue) will have much better health service than the poorer municipalities while municipalities 
with lower fiscal capacity (and less health service) will enjoy positive externality provided by 
their richer neighbors. 
 
Proliferation and service delivery 
 While there is much debate on pro and contra on the latest proliferation that nearly 
doubled the number of local governments in Indonesia after decentralization, careful 
examinations on how proliferation affected service delivery are limited. This study extends the 
examination of decentralized service delivery by including the proliferation process into 
consideration. 
 The results from the examination of proliferation provides similar conclusion with the 
general effect of decentralization on health and education service delivery. Proliferation seem to 
benefit education services, as the proliferated local governments (newly created and originating 
municipalities) experience improvement in enrollment rate, years of schooling and dropout rates. 
These results are statistically significant and consistent for different estimation methods. More 
interestingly, education outcomes improved for both new and originating municipalities, thus 
proving that proliferation are not simply redistributing resources away from originating districts 
to the newly created ones.  
 The analysis of health outcomes also resulted in similar conclusions with the previous 
examination for the overall effects of decentralization. In general, the mortality measures are 
significantly lower for the proliferated municipalities, and the results are consistent for different 
estimation methods. However, other health outcomes measures are lower for both originating 
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and newly created municipalities, which is consistent with the results from general 
decentralization examination. From this exercise there is also no evidence that proliferation is 
hurting the originating municipalities, as both new and originating municipalities experience 
similar changes in outcomes. 
 
Conclusion, policy implications and limitations of the study 
 After careful empirical examination, decentralization reform in Indonesia does improve 
education and health service delivery to different degrees. Decentralized government seems to 
significantly improved education service delivery, which expressed by improvement in most 
measured education outcomes. Moreover, decentralization also brings service that is better 
related to local needs and more responsive to local political participation.  
 Since the government has successfully encouraged mandatory primary education since 
the beginning of decentralization, now it is time to switch the priority to providing improved 
secondary education services. The test results show that more municipalities experience lower 
enrollment rates for junior and high school, and the figures are even lower for female 
enrollments. If secondary education is more available, more students will have the opportunity to 
continue education after finishing primary school. 
 Health service delivery in general also improves with decentralization, which apparent 
from lower mortality rate and longer life expectancy which indicate overall improvement in 
health care. However, access to health facilities are not improved with decentralization since the 
largest proportion of local governments in Indonesia experiencing lower health service 
utilization rate over time. Results also show that government allocation of resources for health 
service does not correspondent with indicator of local needs, as municipalities with lower 
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available health service does not necessarily invest more to improve the quality of service in 
their localities.  
 Poor performance of health services, uneven distribution of health facilities and limited 
access to affordable health services requires immediate attention from the government. 
Compared to education, total government expenditure for health services is significantly lower 
although the service is equally important to improve human resource quality. There is an urgent 
need for health service reform in Indonesia, which requires not only allocation of more 
resources, but more importantly significant changes in national health policy. 
 The empirical study on the performance of proliferated municipalities provides similar 
conclusions to those obtained in the examination of general decentralization performance. 
Proliferated municipalities experience improvement in education outcomes but not so for health 
outcomes; these results are consistent with the previous examination. Therefore, from the result 
of this study, there is no evidence to reject proliferation as it does not hurt health and education 
service delivery outcomes. 
It is important to emphasize that proliferation is not necessarily an evil, as proliferation 
may have resulted in improvements in government efficiency due to greater accountability and 
improved allocative efficiency associated with smaller size of governments. Without significant 
sacrifices in economies of scale, thus considering the size of population, area, and diversity of 
Indonesia, it is possible that proliferation may be necessary in some part of the country. The 
government needs to regulate the proliferation process and consistently follow through the 
regulation to ensure that the newly created local governments are qualified to run its own 
administration.     
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There are some limitations to this study that will open possibilities for future research in 
examination of health and education service delivery in Indonesia. First of all, this study will 
benefit greatly from the analysis of local government expenditures on health and education 
services, as we will be able to observe whether or not changes in local government expenditures 
after decentralization/proliferation related to changes in service delivery. However, there was 
inconsistency in local governments‟ fiscal reporting format, which made it harder to compare 
local government expenditures for different municipalities over time. Second, this study ignores 
the role of central government in health and education service delivery by assuming that central 
government‟s role is limited to setting the National Policy in health and education. This 
assumption is unrealistic, because in reality central government still play important roles in 
financing and providing health and education services. Third, the observation period may be too 
short, since it has been less than a decade since decentralization reform took place in Indonesia. 
Some types of health and education services may need more time to improve; or the benefits 
from decentralized health and education services are not available immediately. For example, we 
cannot expect for measures like adult literacy rates to improve immediately after decentralization 
reform in 2001, or health facilities to become more available right after the proliferation. 
Therefore, it is important to continue the examination of local governments‟ performance in the 
future to better assess the impact of decentralization and proliferation to service delivery in 
Indonesia.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
OUTCOMES OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION SECTORS 
 
Table A1. Health outcomes calculated from Household Survey (SUSENAS) 
 
Outcome indicator 
 
Definition Data 
availability 
Infant mortality rate Number of children age 0-12 months died / 1,000 
life birth 
1994-2006 
Under 5 mortality rate Number of children age 1-4 years died / number of 
children age 1-4 years 
1996-2006 
Life expectancy at 
birth 
Expected number of years of life remaining at birth, 
assuming that mortality pattern is constant 
1994-2006 
Labor assisted by 
medical worker 
Number of labor assisted by medical worker (doctor, 
midwife, paramedics) / number of children age 1-4 
years 
1994-2006 
Health services 
utilization rate 
Number of people in need of medical treatment (i.e., 
had health complaints enough to disrupt their daily 
activities) that seek treatment at hospital, private 
clinic, community health clinic (Puskesmas) or 
consult with medical personnel / number of people 
in need of medical treatment 
1994-2006 
Vaccination coverage 
(DPT/Polio) 
Number of children age 0-3 years with minimum 3 
doses of DPT/Polio vaccines / number of children 
age 0-3 years  
1994-1999 
2004-2006 
Contraceptive 
prevalence rate 
Number of married women age 15-49 years who 
currently using contraceptive / number of married 
women age 15-49 years 
1994-2006 
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Table A2. Education outcomes calculated from Household Survey (SUSENAS) 
 
Outcome indicator 
 
Definition Data 
availability 
(Female) Adult 
literacy rate 
People (female) age 15 and up who can read and 
write Latin alphabet 
1994-2004 
Mean years of 
schooling 
Municipal average of years of schooling enjoyed by 
citizen 15 years and up 
1994-2004 
Net enrollment rate: 
middle school 
(general/female) 
Number of children (female) age 13-15 years 
currently attending school/ number of children 
(female) age 13-15 years 
1994-2006 
Net enrollment rate: 
high school 
(general/female) 
Number of children (female) age 16-18 years 
currently attending school/ number of children 
(female) age 16-18 years 
1994-2006 
Dropout rate: primary 
school 
Number of children age 7-12 years who was 
enrolled in primary school, but no longer attended 
school  
1994-2006 
Dropout rate: middle 
school 
Number of children age 13-15 years who was  
enrolled in middle school, but no longer attended 
school 
1994-2006 
Dropout rate: high 
school 
Number of children age 16-18 years who was  
enrolled in high  school, but no longer attended 
school 
1994-2006 
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APPENDIX B 
INDICATORS OF PENETRATION RATES AND OTHER DETERMINANTS OF 
HEALTH AND EDUCATION SERVICES 
 
 
Table B1. Indicators of health service penetration rates and health service needs  
 
Indicator Definition Mean St. dev Min Max 
Health service penetration 
     Number of hospital/ 
community health centers 
Average number of hospital and 
community health center (Puskesmas) 
per village 
0.20 0.36 0.00 2.46
Number of health clinics Average number of private health clinics 
per village 
2.03 2.665 0.08 21.89 
Number of doctors (MD) Average number of doctors working per 
village 
0.33 0.41 0.00 1.95 
Number of dentists Average number of dentists working per 
village 
0.15 0.27 0.00 1.72 
Number of midwives Average number of midwives working 
per village 
1.77 0.45 0.43 3.00 
Number of paramedics Average number of other trained medical 
workers per village 
0.77 0.41 0.12 2.00 
Health service needs 
 
    
Number of epidemic  Average number of epidemic occurred in 
the last year per village 
0.62 0.56 0.00 3.77 
 
Source: Author‟s calculation from Survey of Village Economic Potential Survey (PODES) 1999 
 
 
 
 
Table B2. Indicators of education service penetration rate 
 
Indicator Definition Mean St. dev Min Max 
Number of primary school Average number of primary schools per 
village 
2.93 2.11 0.38 16.11 
Number of junior high 
school 
Average number of junior high schools 
per village 
0.59 0.66 0.00 5.49 
Number of high schools 
Average number of high schools per 
village 
0.35 0.53 0.00 4.11 
 
Source: Author‟s calculation from Survey of Village Economic Potential Survey (PODES) 1999 
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Table B3. Other determinants of health and education services  
 
 
Indicator Definition Mean St. dev Min Max 
Social/community institutions      
Village social & safety board 
(LKMD) 
Presence of Village Social and Safety 
Board (Yes = 1, No = 0) 
0.78 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Village consultative board 
(LMD) 
Presence of Village Consultative 
Board (Yes = 1 , No = 0) 
0.69 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Social/charitable organization Average number of social/charitable 
organizations per village 
5.34 1.45 0.44 7.64 
Economic/banking institutions      
Community credit union Average number of community credit 
unions per village 
0.10 0.15 0.00 0.98 
Cooperative Average number of cooperatives per 
village 
0.69 0.48 0.02 2.93 
Manufacturing industry Average number of manufacturing 
industries per village 
17.20 25.65 0.00 258.18 
Technical education Average number of technical learning 
center per village 
0.38 0.61 0.00 3.67 
Local fiscal capacity      
Own source revenue share Ratio of own source revenue to total 
local government revenue 
0.07 0.08 0.00 0.59 
 
Source: Author‟s calculation from Survey of Village Economic Potential Survey (PODES) 1999; Ministry of 
Finance 
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APPENDIX C 
DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN HEALTH AND EDUCATION SERVICE 
DELIVERY AFTER DECENTRALIZATION 
 
 
 
Table C1. List of variables 
 
Outcome Definition Outcome Definition 
 AdLit Adult literacy rate IMR Infant mortality rate 
 AdLitP Female adult literacy rate U5MR Under 5 mortality rate 
DOPSc Dropout rate, primary school LEAB Life expectancy at birth 
DOMSc Dropout rate, middle school SURate Health service utilization rate 
DOHSc Dropout rate, high school BAtt Labor attended by medical worker 
MYr Mean years of schooling DPT Vaccination coverage, DPT 
NERSMA Net enrollment rate, high school Pol Vaccination coverage, Polio 
NERSMAP Female net enrollment rate, high school KB Contraceptive prevalence rate 
NERSMP Net enrollment rate, middle school 
 NERSMPP Female net enrollment rate, middle school 
 
      Determinants of changes 
   avdbidan Number of midwives 
  avdbpr Community credit union 
  avddokter Number of doctors 
   avddrg Number of dentists 
   avdindolah Manufacturing industry 
  avdklinik Number of private health clinics 
 avdkop Number of cooperatives 
  avdlketr Technical education 
   avdlkmd Village social & safety board (LKMD) 
 avdlmd Village consultative board (LMD) 
 avdprmedik Number of other medical workers 
 avdrs Number of hospitals and community health centers 
avdsd Number of primary schools 
  avdslta Number of high schools 
  avdsltp Number of junior high schools 
  avdsosmas Number of charitable organizations 
 avdwabah Number of epidemics 
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Table C2. Determinants of changes in health service delivery after decentralization 
 
Variable IMR U5MR LEAB SURate BAtt DPT Pol KB 
                  
avdrs -0.006 -0.01 -0.65 9.76** 14.51 -3.15 3.57 5.79 
 
(-0.49) (-0.52) (-0.23) (2.06) (1.47) (-0.40) (0.47) (1.16) 
avdklinik 0.003 -0.00 0.52 -0.12 1.66 0.40 0.52 -0.60 
 
(1.25) (-0.63) (1.12) (-0.16) (1.03) (0.32) (0.43) (-0.73) 
avddokter 0.034* -0.00 5.74 -4.38 -38.14** -4.49 -9.46 -9.06 
 
(1.76) (-0.17) (1.32) (-0.61) (-2.57) (-0.38) (-0.83) (-1.20) 
avddrg -0.041 0.03 -6.62 2.32 -31.65 -6.78 -5.76 4.45 
 
(-1.42) (0.75) (-1.01) (0.21) (-1.40) (-0.38) (-0.33) (0.39) 
avdprmedik 0.001 0.01 -0.76 -2.08 16.60** 8.22 4.25 -5.48 
 
(0.10) (0.81) (-0.38) (-0.63) (2.40) (1.51) (0.80) (-1.56) 
avdbidan 0.006 -0.00 1.71 0.99 -7.06 -2.17 -2.37 3.34 
 
(1.01) (-0.07) (1.19) (0.42) (-1.44) (-0.56) (-0.63) (1.34) 
avdwabah 0.006 -0.00 1.46* -0.43 -4.60 -0.57 -1.52 1.35 
 
(1.63) (-0.45) (1.66) (-0.30) (-1.53) (-0.24) (-0.67) (0.89) 
avdlkmd -0.004 0.02 -1.13 5.86 19.57** 6.67 2.26 1.45 
 
(-0.34) (1.50) (-0.48) (1.51) (2.42) (1.04) (0.37) (0.35) 
avdlmd 0.014 0.01 2.44 1.76 -7.61 3.66 3.15 -2.71 
 
(1.17) (0.30) (0.92) (0.40) (-0.84) (0.51) (0.45) (-0.59) 
avdsosmas -0.002 -0.00 -0.24 -1.46 -2.30 -3.39** -2.89* 2.50** 
 
(-0.75) (-0.89) (-0.41) (-1.53) (-1.16) (-2.16) (-1.91) (2.48) 
avdbpr -0.026* 0.04** -4.19 -8.43 -16.33 10.84 14.95* 2.68 
 
(-1.70) (2.06) (-1.22) (-1.48) (-1.38) (1.16) (1.65) (0.45) 
avdkop 0.000 -0.01 -0.18 2.06 7.20 2.39 3.74 0.61 
 
(0.06) (-0.89) (-0.10) (0.67) (1.12) (0.47) (0.76) (0.19) 
avdindolah -0.000 0.00** -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.06* 
 
(-1.37) (2.29) (-1.21) (0.66) (-0.66) (-1.35) (-0.96) (1.75) 
avdlketr -0.005 0.01 -0.92 -2.53 6.27 4.96 4.75 4.34 
 
(-0.74) (0.75) (-0.55) (-0.90) (1.07) (1.07) (1.06) (1.46) 
revshare -0.053** 0.11*** -11.58** 6.62 88.86*** -45.68*** -44.55*** 2.08 
 
(-2.15) (3.05) (-2.07) (0.71) (4.59) (-3.00) (-3.02) (0.21) 
Constant 0.004 0.02 2.36 31.56*** 53.49*** -11.90 1.70 21.01*** 
 
(0.25) (0.73) (0.67) (5.33) (4.34) (-1.22) (0.18) (3.36) 
         Observations 365 365 365 382 381 382 382 382 
R-squared 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.13 
 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table C3. Determinants of changes in education service delivery after decentralization 
 
Variables AdLit AdLitP DOPSc DOMSc DOHSc MYr 
avdlkmd 2.81 4.63 -1.70*** -4.01*** -8.72*** 0.39 
 
(1.00) (1.37) (-3.17) (-2.92) (-3.06) (1.17) 
avdlmd -0.49 1.12 -0.43 -2.72** -1.62 -0.27 
 
(-0.18) (0.34) (-0.90) (-2.19) (-0.60) (-0.83) 
avdsosmas -1.19* -1.34* -0.01 -0.18 -0.16 -0.16** 
 
(-1.78) (-1.66) (-0.09) (-0.57) (-0.25) (-2.00) 
avdbpr 17.63*** 20.76*** -1.16 -1.40 -0.97 -0.38 
 
(4.28) (4.17) (-1.47) (-0.69) (-0.23) (-0.78) 
avdkop -2.95 -3.34 -0.69 0.54 -3.42 0.39 
 
(-1.35) (-1.26) (-1.63) (0.51) (-1.56) (1.51) 
avdindolah 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
 
(1.27) (1.44) (1.01) (-1.26) (-0.70) (0.15) 
avdlketr -2.11 -2.23 0.40 -0.52 1.51 0.04 
 
(-1.14) (-0.99) (1.26) (-0.62) (0.81) (0.19) 
revshare -22.89*** -28.26*** -4.00*** -9.91*** -13.68* 6.75*** 
 
(-3.24) (-3.32) (-3.00) (-2.91) (-1.93) (8.21) 
avdsd 0.47 0.54 -0.11 
  
-0.06 
 
(0.62) (0.59) (-1.41) 
  
(-0.64) 
avdsltp -3.54 -4.15 
 
-0.78
 
0.47 
 
(-1.03) (-1.00) 
 
(-1.21) 
 
(1.14) 
avdslta 5.63 6.86 
  
0.65 -0.89* 
 
(1.34) (1.36) 
  
(0.31) (-1.83) 
Constant 15.79*** 13.98*** 2.81*** 7.07*** 13.52*** 0.49 
 
(4.65) (3.41) (4.49) (4.41) (3.97) (1.20) 
       Observations 379 379 382 382 382 382
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.17 
 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table C3. Determinants of changes in education service delivery after decentralization 
(continued) 
 
Variables NERSMA NERSMAP NERSMP NERSMPP 
avdlkmd 13.56*** 14.23** 11.35** 8.41 
 
(2.59) (2.57) (2.42) (1.63) 
avdlmd -3.08 -5.81 1.63 1.40 
 
(-0.62) (-1.10) (0.38) (0.30) 
avdsosmas -1.73 -1.47 -1.03 -0.25 
 
(-1.42) (-1.14) (-0.94) (-0.21) 
avdbpr -2.01 -4.27 -3.68 -6.28 
 
(-0.26) (-0.53) (-0.54) (-0.83) 
avdkop 7.17* 7.74* 4.88 5.26 
 
(1.78) (1.82) (1.35) (1.32) 
avdindolah 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 
(0.65) (0.16) (-0.20) (-0.50) 
avdlketr -0.85 -0.11 -1.12 -0.92 
 
(-0.25) (-0.03) (-0.39) (-0.29) 
revshare 61.28*** 49.36*** 54.46*** 46.82*** 
 
(4.73) (3.60) (4.69) (3.65) 
avdsd 
    
     avdsltp 
  
-0.48 -1.22
   
(-0.22) (-0.50) 
avdslta -6.94* -9.09**
  
 
(-1.80) (-2.23) 
  Constant 23.92*** 27.23*** -0.83 8.92
 
(3.83) (4.12) (-0.15) (1.48) 
     Observations 382 382 382 382
R-squared 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.06 
 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX D 
EFFECTS OF PROLIFERATION ON HEALTH AND EDUCATION SERVICES 
 
Table D1. List of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
dpn Proliferation-interacted dummy for newly created municipalities 
dpo Proliferation-interacted dummy for newly created municipalities 
new06 Dummy for newly created municipalities 
ori06 Dummy for originating municipalities 
d95-d06 Dummy year (1995-2006) 
dnyear0 Dummy for year of split for newly created municipalities  
doyear0 Dummy for year of split for originating municipalities  
dpr Dummy for municipalities created by Parliament/DPR‟s initiative 
aceh Dummy for municipalities in Aceh 
papua Dummy for municipalities in Papua 
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Table D2. Effect of proliferation on health outcomes 
 
 
Full sample Restricted sample 
Outcome OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
 
dpn dpo Dpn dpo dpn dpo dpn dpn dpn 
IMR -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
(-3.04) (-1.60) (-3.27) (-2.90) (-3.22) (-2.68) (-2.85) (-2.68) (-2.73) 
LEAB 1.06** 0.58 0.08 0.60 0.05 0.61 1.09** 0.82** 0.84** 
 
2.18 1.07 (0.20) (1.32) (0.11) (1.33) (2.36) (2.03) (2.09) 
U5MR -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.10 0.24 -0.14 0.25 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 
-7.60 -4.92 (-0.29) (0.63) (-0.39) (0.64) (-6.36) (-6.87) (-6.96) 
SURate -4.03*** -4.29*** -3.35*** -2.71*** -3.54*** -3.11*** 1.25 -0.36 0.16 
 
(-4.47) (-4.99) (-4.06) (-3.26) (-4.38) (-3.86) (1.09) (-0.29) (0.14) 
BAtt -3.38** -3.10** -3.30*** 2.58** -3.38*** 2.02** -0.00 -5.20*** -4.43*** 
 
(-2.11) (-2.05) (-3.29) (2.56) (-3.37) (2.02) (-0.00) (-3.45) (-3.02) 
DPT -6.92*** -7.88*** -4.52*** -3.59*** -4.66*** -4.07*** -0.603 -1.48 -1.50 
 
(1.66) (1.62) (-3.48) (-3.68) (-2.85) (-3.30) (2.008) (-0.74) (-0.80) 
Pol -6.17*** -6.85*** -3.43*** -3.32*** -3.65*** -3.73*** -0.48 -1.07 -1.07 
 
-3.82 -4.39 (-2.64) (-2.63) (-2.87) (-3.02) (-0.24) (-0.53) (-0.57) 
KB 0.24 -1.49 -0.45 3.19*** -0.42 2.95*** 1.74 -2.72*** -2.37*** 
 
(0.23) (-1.55) (-0.80) (5.61) (-0.75) (5.22) (1.43) (-3.20) (-2.83) 
 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table D3. Effect of proliferation on education outcomes 
 
 
Full sample Restricted sample 
Outcome OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
 
dpn dpo dpn dpo dpn dpo dpn dpn dpn 
AdLit -0.79 0.98 0.78* 1.07** 0.79* 0.99** -0.37 0.40 0.30 
 
(0.88) (0.91) (1.86) (2.25) (1.92) (2.13) (-0.48) (0.71) (0.55) 
AdLitP -0.301 1.37 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.07 0.35 0.29 
 
-0.29 1.29 (-8.15) (-6.26) (-8.27) (-6.18) (-0.08) (0.54) (0.46) 
MYr 0.06 -0.02 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.90) (-0.38) (4.07) (5.72) (3.97) (5.44) (1.62) (-0.76) (-0.60) 
NERSMP 0.75 1.81* 3.03*** 3.63*** 2.84*** 3.43*** 0.22 0.98 0.81 
 
(0.74) (1.86) (4.46) (5.28) (4.20) (5.04) (0.20) (0.96) (0.82) 
NERSMPP 0.22 2.03* 2.93*** 3.79*** 2.62*** 3.53*** -0.33 0.74 0.45 
 
(0.20) (1.92) (3.55) (4.53) (3.21) (4.28) (-0.27) (0.59) (0.37) 
NERSMA 1.21 1.13 4.27*** 3.67*** 4.10*** 3.50*** 0.58 1.53 1.36 
 
(1.05) (1.03) (6.69) (5.68) (6.44) (5.44) (0.47) (1.58) (1.43) 
NERSMAP 0.70 1.11 3.78*** 3.91*** 3.56*** 3.69*** 0.18 1.14 0.93 
 
(0.57) (0.95) (4.97) (5.08) (4.69) (4.82) (0.13) (1.01) (0.84) 
DOPSc -0.40*** -0.24** -0.39*** -0.45*** -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.22 -0.07 -0.11 
 
(-3.40) (-2.13) (-3.57) (-4.05) (-3.64) (-3.68) (-1.52) (-0.44) (-0.76) 
DOMSc -1.40*** -1.44*** -1.67*** -1.11*** -1.53*** -1.22*** -0.46 -0.87 -0.69 
 
(-4.07) (-4.38) (-4.58) (-3.03) (-4.42) (-3.56) (-0.94) (-1.45) (-1.31) 
DOHSc -1.36** -1.03 -3.27*** -0.96 -2.25*** -0.97 -0.04 -1.34 -0.62 
 
(-2.00) (-1.61) (-4.34) (-1.30) (-3.22) (-1.45) (-0.04) (-1.13) (-0.61) 
 
Note: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table D4. Full sample estimates for health outcomes 
 
Variable IMR U5MR LEAB SURate 
 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
new06 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.05*** 0.00 -0.33 -1.18 -3.32*** 
 
(.) (1.75) (.) (19.38) (.) (-0.54) (-1.24) (-3.95) 
ori06 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.00 -2.16*** 0.60 -1.39** 
 
(.) (3.47) (.) (20.56) (.) (-3.44) (0.79) (-2.17) 
d95 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
-1.08 -1.07 0.35 0.38 
 
(1.10) (1.08) (.) 
 
(-1.31) (-1.30) (0.50) (0.54) 
d96 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01** -0.77 -0.76 -1.24* -1.25* 
 
(0.88) (0.87) (2.30) (2.38) (-0.94) (-0.93) (-1.78) (-1.77) 
d97 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.62 -0.64 3.07*** 3.07*** 
 
(0.91) (0.95) (2.98) (3.18) (-0.91) (-0.95) (4.39) (4.35) 
d98 -0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.08 0.01 -14.48*** -14.48*** 
 
(-0.19) (-0.08) (2.66) (2.90) (0.11) (0.02) (-20.70) (-20.55) 
d99 -0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.07 0.06 -12.46*** -12.39*** 
 
(-0.13) (-0.12) (2.71) (2.82) (0.10) (0.09) (-17.51) (-17.28) 
d00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 
 
1.06 1.09 -21.35*** -21.30*** 
 
(-1.44) (-1.53) (.) 
 
(1.52) (1.57) (-28.34) (-28.18) 
d01 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.16 -0.09 -18.38*** -18.23*** 
 
(0.27) (0.11) (3.48) (3.35) (-0.22) (-0.13) (-25.14) (-24.92) 
d02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.99 -19.56*** -19.31*** 
 
(-1.10) (-1.25) (1.05) (0.95) (1.30) (1.41) (-26.28) (-25.85) 
d03 -0.01* -0.01* 0.00 0.00 1.55** 1.60** -18.14*** -17.93*** 
 
(-1.68) (-1.82) (1.57) (1.51) (2.17) (2.26) (-24.20) (-23.87) 
d04 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 3.46*** 3.51*** -19.48*** -19.32*** 
 
(-3.82) (-3.97) (-1.18) (-1.25) (4.82) (4.92) (-25.86) (-25.60) 
d05 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** 3.67*** 3.70*** -23.72*** -23.45*** 
 
(-4.20) (-4.30) (-2.56) (-2.55) (5.12) (5.19) (-31.47) (-31.10) 
d06 -0.01** -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
-24.36*** -24.21*** 
 
(-2.08) (-2.21) (0.27) (0.28) (.) 
 
(-32.32) (-32.19) 
dnyear0 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01** 0.50 0.48 -5.09*** -5.46*** 
 
(-1.03) (-1.00) (-1.97) (-1.97) (0.90) (0.87) (-4.45) (-4.77) 
doyear0 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.18 -0.29 -1.65 -2.26* 
 
(0.31) (0.51) (-1.10) (-0.81) (-0.27) (-0.44) (-1.28) (-1.76) 
dpn -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.78* 0.79* -3.35*** -3.54*** 
 
(-3.27) (-3.22) (-8.15) (-8.27) (1.86) (1.92) (-4.06) (-4.38) 
dpo -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 1.07** 0.99** -2.71*** -3.11*** 
 
(-2.90) (-2.68) (-6.26) (-6.18) (2.25) (2.13) (-3.26) (-3.86) 
dpr 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.06** 0.00 -3.05** 
 
(.) (1.70) (.) (1.17) (.) (-2.31) (.) (-2.05) 
aceh 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 1.58 0.00 5.19*** 
 
(.) (-1.99) (.) (-2.27) (.) (1.50) (.) (2.68) 
papua 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.02 0.00 5.71*** 
 
(.) (1.12) (.) (0.71) (.) (-1.23) (.) (3.85) 
Constant 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 65.63*** 66.20*** 66.54*** 66.70*** 
 
(16.16) (13.70) (22.86) (6.10) (104.71) (93.04) (119.41) (98.32) 
Observations 4,255 4,255 4,113 4,113 3,816 3,816 5,322 5,322 
R-squared 0.09 
 
0.09 
 
0.11 
 
0.52 
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Table D4. Full sample estimates for health outcomes (continued) 
 
Variable BAtt DPT Pol KB 
 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
new06 0.29 -1.19 2.06 -0.12 2.65* -0.43 -1.07 -1.01 
 
(0.25) (-1.07) (1.41) (-0.09) (1.81) (-0.33) (-1.64) (-1.61) 
ori06 -0.22 -1.63* -0.44 -2.42** 1.94 -0.98 -2.30*** -2.10*** 
 
(-0.23) (-1.86) (-0.36) (-2.32) (1.63) (-0.95) (-4.43) (-4.19) 
d95 2.14** 2.15** -4.59*** -2.84*** -13.74*** 
 
1.90*** 1.91*** 
 
(2.51) (2.51) (-4.92) (-3.07) (-14.70) 
 
(3.96) (3.96) 
d96 6.98*** 6.98*** -4.69*** -2.92*** -8.56*** 5.20*** 1.12** 1.12** 
 
(8.25) (8.20) (-5.05) (-3.16) (-9.20) (6.24) (2.35) (2.35) 
d97 9.97*** 9.97*** -1.18 0.59 -1.97** 11.79*** 2.35*** 2.35*** 
 
(11.76) (11.70) (-1.28) (0.64) (-2.12) (14.16) (4.94) (4.93) 
d98 7.09*** 7.09*** -3.56*** -1.78* -3.73*** 10.03*** 2.27*** 2.27*** 
 
(8.38) (8.33) (-3.84) (-1.93) (-4.02) (12.05) (4.76) (4.75) 
d99 16.18*** 16.24*** -2.79*** -0.91 -7.56*** 6.34*** 1.91*** 1.92*** 
 
(18.78) (18.74) (-2.94) (-0.97) (-7.95) (7.27) (3.94) (3.96) 
d00 18.71*** 18.90*** 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.60 -0.54 
 
(20.50) (20.62) (.) 
 
(.) 
 
(-1.18) (-1.06) 
d01 19.91*** 20.22*** 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-2.41*** -2.38*** 
 
(22.53) (22.81) (.) 
 
(.) 
 
(-4.85) (-4.78) 
d02 20.47*** 20.80*** 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
-0.68 -0.61 
 
(22.73) (23.01) (.) 
 
(.) 
 
(-1.35) (-1.21) 
d03 22.22*** 22.52*** 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.11 0.15 
 
(24.51) (24.74) (.) 
 
(.) 
 
(0.21) (0.29) 
d04 24.73*** 25.01*** -6.06*** -4.08*** -12.44*** 1.58* 1.99*** 2.04*** 
 
(27.13) (27.33) (-7.35) (-4.95) (-15.06) (1.69) (3.87) (3.96) 
d05 23.42*** 23.76*** -2.04** 
 
-7.48*** 6.61*** 2.56*** 2.64*** 
 
(25.70) (25.98) (-2.51) 
 
(-9.21) (7.11) (4.99) (5.13) 
d06 24.73*** 25.00*** 0.00 2.02** 0.00 14.07*** 3.20*** 3.25*** 
 
(27.13) (27.36) (.) (2.49) (.) (15.12) (6.24) (6.34) 
dnyear0 -2.78** -2.91** -1.42 -1.86 0.04 -0.64 -0.70 -0.71 
 
(-2.02) (-2.10) (-0.60) (-0.79) (0.02) (-0.27) (-0.90) (-0.91) 
doyear0 1.10 0.53 0.91 0.04 0.78 -0.25 1.18 1.06 
 
(0.71) (0.34) (0.37) (0.01) (0.32) (-0.10) (1.34) (1.20) 
dpn -3.30*** -3.38*** -4.52*** -4.66*** -3.43*** -3.65*** -0.45 -0.42 
 
(-3.29) (-3.37) (-3.48) (-3.68) (-2.64) (-2.87) (-0.80) (-0.75) 
dpo 2.58** 2.02** -3.59*** -4.07*** -3.32*** -3.73*** 3.19*** 2.95*** 
 
(2.56) (2.02) (-2.85) (-3.30) (-2.63) (-3.02) (5.61) (5.22) 
dpr 0.00 -6.60** 0.00 -8.38*** 0.00 -8.81*** 0.00 -2.85 
 
(.) (-1.98) (.) (-3.22) (.) (-3.59) (.) (-1.28) 
aceh 0.00 4.67 0.00 -19.86*** 0.00 -16.81*** 0.00 -11.11*** 
 
(.) (1.06) (.) (-5.87) (.) (-5.28) (.) (-3.75) 
papua 0.00 -9.87*** 0.00 -7.55*** 0.00 -6.83*** 0.00 -19.07*** 
 
(.) (-3.04) (.) (-2.82) (.) (-2.70) (.) (-8.80) 
Constant 46.79*** 47.07*** 44.58*** 45.21*** 51.33*** 40.09*** 50.27*** 51.12*** 
 
(69.39) (39.38) (55.91) (43.20) (64.25) (41.32) (132.50) (66.46) 
Observations 5,313 5,313 3,376 3,376 3,376 3,376 5,325 5,325 
R-squared 0.33 
 
0.04 
 
0.15 
 
0.07 
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Table D5. Full sample estimates for education outcomes 
 
Variable AdLit AdLitP NERSMP NERSMPP 
 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
new06 -2.68*** -2.14*** -3.20*** -2.55*** -2.16*** -2.65*** -1.66* -2.31*** 
 
(-6.26) (-5.05) (-6.36) (-5.13) (-2.75) (-3.53) (-1.73) (-2.59) 
ori06 -1.65*** -1.24*** -2.04*** -1.55*** -2.61*** -3.14*** -2.05*** -2.81*** 
 
(-4.94) (-3.78) (-5.22) (-4.03) (-4.14) (-5.30) (-2.68) (-4.00) 
d95 -1.19*** -1.19*** -1.57*** -1.57*** 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.38 
 
(-4.39) (-4.33) (-4.94) (-4.88) (0.30) (0.29) (0.55) (0.54) 
d96 -0.13 -0.13 -0.09 -0.09 3.25*** 3.26*** 4.00*** 4.00*** 
 
(-0.49) (-0.48) (-0.29) (-0.28) (5.63) (5.61) (5.69) (5.67) 
d97 1.58*** 1.58*** 1.90*** 1.90*** 6.37*** 6.38*** 6.71*** 6.72*** 
 
(5.85) (5.80) (5.99) (5.95) (11.03) (10.99) (9.56) (9.52) 
d98 2.14*** 2.14*** 2.60*** 2.60*** 5.44*** 5.45*** 5.91*** 5.92*** 
 
(7.92) (7.86) (8.20) (8.14) (9.43) (9.40) (8.42) (8.39) 
d99 2.59*** 2.58*** 3.22*** 3.21*** 7.24*** 7.27*** 8.29*** 8.33*** 
 
(9.42) (9.32) (9.99) (9.89) (12.33) (12.33) (11.61) (11.62) 
d00 2.46*** 2.47*** 3.30*** 3.31*** 7.91*** 8.05*** 8.91*** 9.11*** 
 
(8.44) (8.39) (9.65) (9.59) (12.72) (12.92) (11.78) (12.03) 
d01 2.96*** 2.94*** 3.77*** 3.75*** 9.31*** 9.47*** 10.70*** 10.92*** 
 
(10.40) (10.28) (11.31) (11.19) (15.44) (15.69) (14.58) (14.88) 
d02 4.24*** 4.25*** 5.51*** 5.52*** 9.26*** 9.47*** 10.05*** 10.35*** 
 
(14.66) (14.57) (16.25) (16.14) (15.07) (15.37) (13.45) (13.83) 
d03 4.33*** 4.33*** 5.79*** 5.80*** 11.45*** 11.66*** 12.56*** 12.87*** 
 
(14.75) (14.64) (16.84) (16.71) (18.52) (18.83) (16.71) (17.09) 
d04 5.01*** 5.02*** 6.48*** 6.49*** 13.70*** 13.93*** 14.55*** 14.87*** 
 
(16.71) (16.58) (18.44) (18.30) (22.03) (22.36) (19.25) (19.64) 
d05 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
13.80*** 14.04*** 14.65*** 14.99*** 
 
(.) 
 
(.) 
 
(22.19) (22.55) (19.37) (19.80) 
d06 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
15.36*** 15.59*** 15.25*** 15.56*** 
 
(.) 
 
(.) 
 
(24.70) (25.05) (20.16) (20.60) 
dnyear0 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.11 2.26** 2.16** 0.63 0.47 
 
(0.31) (0.39) (0.13) (0.22) (2.41) (2.29) (0.55) (0.41) 
doyear0 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.00 -0.34 -0.54 
 
(0.15) (0.28) (0.25) (0.37) (0.14) (0.00) (-0.26) (-0.42) 
dpn -0.10 -0.14 0.08 0.05 3.03*** 2.84*** 2.93*** 2.62*** 
 
(-0.29) (-0.39) (0.20) (0.11) (4.46) (4.20) (3.55) (3.21) 
dpo 0.24 0.25 0.60 0.61 3.63*** 3.43*** 3.79*** 3.53*** 
 
(0.63) (0.64) (1.32) (1.33) (5.28) (5.04) (4.53) (4.28) 
dpr 0.00 5.77*** 0.00 7.27*** 0.00 -1.20 0.00 0.05 
 
(.) (2.91) (.) (3.21) (.) (-0.57) (.) (0.02) 
aceh 0.00 5.08* 0.00 5.60* 0.00 7.91*** 0.00 6.92** 
 
(.) (1.95) (.) (1.89) (.) (2.84) (.) (2.41) 
papua 0.00 -9.28*** 0.00 -9.79*** 0.00 -14.62*** 0.00 -15.25*** 
 
(.) (-4.90) (.) (-4.53) (.) (-7.09) (.) (-7.12) 
Constant 84.61*** 84.02*** 79.83*** 79.16*** 49.79*** 50.16*** 49.77*** 50.12*** 
 
(383.52) (132.04) (308.73) (108.94) (108.30) (64.97) (89.00) (59.62) 
Observations 4,457 4,457 4,457 4,457 5,325 5,325 5,325 5,325 
R-squared 0.21 
 
0.25 
 
0.30 
 
0.24 
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Table D5. Full sample estimates for education outcomes (continued)  
 
Variable NERSMA NERSMAP MYr DOPSc 
 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
new06 -1.42* -2.14*** -1.56* -2.37*** -0.12*** -0.15*** 0.26** 0.32*** 
 
(-1.92) (-2.98) (-1.78) (-2.79) (-3.42) (-4.37) (2.10) (2.95) 
ori06 -1.59*** -2.33*** -2.03*** -2.83*** -0.08*** -0.11*** 0.06 0.16** 
 
(-2.69) (-4.09) (-2.87) (-4.22) (-2.78) (-4.00) (0.64) (1.96) 
d95 -0.85 -0.85 -0.58 -0.58 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.14 
 
(-1.56) (-1.55) (-0.89) (-0.89) (0.83) (0.83) (1.54) (1.51) 
d96 0.30 0.30 0.50 0.50 0.13*** 0.13*** -0.10 -0.10 
 
(0.55) (0.56) (0.77) (0.77) (5.25) (5.23) (-1.08) (-1.09) 
d97 2.90*** 2.91*** 3.82*** 3.82*** 0.16*** 0.16*** -0.74*** -0.74*** 
 
(5.35) (5.33) (5.91) (5.89) (6.45) (6.43) (-8.05) (-8.05) 
d98 3.32*** 3.32*** 4.22*** 4.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** -0.13 -0.13 
 
(6.11) (6.09) (6.52) (6.51) (9.51) (9.48) (-1.43) (-1.43) 
d99 4.20*** 4.23*** 5.91*** 5.95*** 0.33*** 0.34*** -0.51*** -0.52*** 
 
(7.60) (7.62) (8.98) (9.01) (13.22) (13.21) (-5.45) (-5.48) 
d00 4.70*** 4.80*** 5.76*** 5.89*** 0.41*** 0.42*** -0.73*** -0.75*** 
 
(8.04) (8.18) (8.27) (8.44) (15.43) (15.51) (-7.33) (-7.52) 
d01 3.96*** 4.10*** 5.13*** 5.31*** -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.63*** -0.66*** 
 
(6.98) (7.21) (7.60) (7.84) (-16.60) (-16.26) (-6.53) (-6.88) 
d02 4.79*** 4.98*** 5.67*** 5.90*** 0.07** 0.07*** -0.33*** -0.35*** 
 
(8.30) (8.58) (8.25) (8.55) (2.52) (2.78) (-3.32) (-3.59) 
d03 6.49*** 6.68*** 7.49*** 7.72*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.56*** -0.59*** 
 
(11.16) (11.45) (10.82) (11.12) (3.28) (3.52) (-5.63) (-5.96) 
d04 9.76*** 9.96*** 10.41*** 10.65*** 0.16*** 0.17*** -0.87*** -0.90*** 
 
(16.71) (16.98) (14.95) (15.26) (6.04) (6.27) (-8.79) (-9.12) 
d05 10.58*** 10.80*** 11.46*** 11.73*** 0.22*** 0.22*** -1.14*** -1.17*** 
 
(18.10) (18.40) (16.46) (16.81) (8.02) (8.26) (-11.50) (-11.85) 
d06 11.59*** 11.78*** 12.64*** 12.89*** 0.25*** 0.26*** -0.81*** -0.83*** 
 
(19.82) (20.10) (18.15) (18.49) (9.30) (9.54) (-8.11) (-8.43) 
dnyear0 1.99** 1.87** 1.23 1.08 0.06 0.05 -0.21 -0.23 
 
(2.25) (2.11) (1.16) (1.02) (1.41) (1.34) (-1.41) (-1.51) 
doyear0 -0.17 -0.35 0.30 0.11 0.04 0.04 -0.40** -0.34** 
 
(-0.17) (-0.34) (0.25) (0.09) (0.97) (0.76) (-2.32) (-2.03) 
dpn 4.27*** 4.10*** 3.78*** 3.56*** 0.12*** 0.12*** -0.39*** -0.38*** 
 
(6.69) (6.44) (4.97) (4.69) (4.07) (3.97) (-3.57) (-3.64) 
dpo 3.67*** 3.50*** 3.91*** 3.69*** 0.17*** 0.16*** -0.45*** -0.39*** 
 
(5.68) (5.44) (5.08) (4.82) (5.72) (5.44) (-4.05) (-3.68) 
dpr 0.00 -4.13* 0.00 -2.36 0.00 -0.30** 0.00 0.13 
 
(.) (-1.65) (.) (-0.91) (.) (-2.05) (.) (0.71) 
aceh 0.00 5.88* 0.00 6.25* 0.00 0.27 0.00 -0.39 
 
(.) (1.77) (.) (1.83) (.) (1.40) (.) (-1.56) 
papua 0.00 -10.85*** 0.00 -11.01*** 0.00 -0.33** 0.00 -0.05 
 
(.) (-4.47) (.) (-4.38) (.) (-2.40) (.) (-0.25) 
Constant 31.66*** 32.26*** 31.39*** 31.89*** 6.57*** 6.60*** 2.36*** 2.36*** 
 
(73.25) (37.31) (60.95) (34.59) (331.20) (137.70) (32.07) (26.82) 
Observations 5,324 5,324 5,320 5,320 5,325 5,325 5,325 5,325 
R-squared 0.27 
 
0.22 
 
0.25 
 
0.10 
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Table D5. Full sample estimates for education outcomes (continued) 
 
Variable DOMSc DOHSc 
 
FE RE FE RE 
new06 -0.19 1.01*** -0.40 1.16* 
 
(-0.46) (3.02) (-0.47) (1.77) 
ori06 0.19 1.36*** -0.33 1.81*** 
 
(0.58) (5.52) (-0.47) (3.82) 
d95 0.62** 0.59* 1.21* 1.20* 
 
(1.98) (1.87) (1.91) (1.88) 
d96 0.35 0.35 1.45** 1.49** 
 
(1.12) (1.11) (2.31) (2.36) 
d97 0.51* 0.52* 1.40** 1.45** 
 
(1.66) (1.65) (2.23) (2.29) 
d98 0.80*** 0.79** 0.90 0.95 
 
(2.58) (2.54) (1.43) (1.51) 
d99 -0.10 -0.12 1.22* 1.20* 
 
(-0.32) (-0.38) (1.91) (1.87) 
d00 -1.44*** -1.57*** -5.16*** -5.42*** 
 
(-4.32) (-4.69) (-7.62) (-8.02) 
d01 -1.75*** -1.95*** -5.28*** -5.71*** 
 
(-5.43) (-6.03) (-8.11) (-8.81) 
d02 0.66** 0.51 1.64** 1.21* 
 
(2.01) (1.56) (2.48) (1.82) 
d03 0.64* 0.49 2.78*** 2.30*** 
 
(1.95) (1.49) (4.16) (3.46) 
d04 -0.65* -0.80** 0.60 0.11 
 
(-1.96) (-2.42) (0.89) (0.16) 
d05 -0.09 -0.29 2.74*** 2.23*** 
 
(-0.28) (-0.88) (4.08) (3.35) 
d06 -0.52 -0.76** 4.65*** 4.05*** 
 
(-1.56) (-2.30) (6.92) (6.10) 
dnyear0 -0.74 -0.59 -0.82 -0.21 
 
(-1.46) (-1.17) (-0.81) (-0.21) 
doyear0 -0.20 -0.20 -0.23 -0.02 
 
(-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.20) (-0.02) 
dpn -1.67*** -1.53*** -3.27*** -2.25*** 
 
(-4.58) (-4.42) (-4.34) (-3.22) 
dpo -1.11*** -1.22*** -0.96 -0.97 
 
(-3.03) (-3.56) (-1.30) (-1.45) 
dpr 0.00 0.45 0.00 2.93*** 
 
(.) (1.03) (.) (3.67) 
aceh 0.00 -0.92 0.00 -0.26 
 
(.) (-1.62) (.) (-0.26) 
papua 0.00 0.91** 0.00 1.57* 
 
(.) (1.99) (.) (1.80) 
Constant 5.04*** 4.62*** 10.70*** 9.87*** 
 
(20.43) (17.88) (21.42) (19.48) 
Observations 5,314 5,314 5,251 5,251 
R-squared 0.05 
 
0.09 
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Table D6. Restricted sample estimates for health outcomes 
 
Variable IMR U5MR LEAB SURate 
   FE RE  FE  RE FE RE FE RE 
new06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04*** 0.00 -0.11 -1.26 -1.83* 
 
(.) (0.92) (.) (13.40) (.) (-0.19) (-1.25) (-1.96) 
d95 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
-1.09 -1.07 -0.03 0.07 
 
(1.10) (1.08) (.) 
 
(-1.24) (-1.22) (-0.02) (0.05) 
d96 0.00 0.00 0.02*** 
 
-0.77 -0.76 -2.61* -2.60* 
 
(0.88) (0.86) (4.43) 
 
(-0.88) (-0.87) (-1.92) (-1.90) 
d97 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** -0.02*** -0.03 0.10 3.72*** 3.72*** 
 
(0.14) (-0.04) (3.59) (-4.64) (-0.05) (0.14) (2.74) (2.72) 
d98 -0.00 -0.00 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.66 0.75 -15.02*** -14.77*** 
 
(-1.00) (-1.11) (3.27) (-4.79) (0.94) (1.08) (-11.30) (-11.11) 
d99 -0.00 -0.00 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.70 0.86 -13.83*** -13.61*** 
 
(-1.02) (-1.24) (2.96) (-5.12) (1.00) (1.23) (-10.05) (-9.88) 
d00 -0.01** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.03*** 1.71** 1.91*** -23.40*** -23.64*** 
 
(-2.46) (-2.75) (.) (-6.57) (2.41) (2.71) (-15.94) (-16.10) 
d01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.48 0.74 -21.63*** -21.70*** 
 
(-0.73) (-1.11) (3.20) (-5.02) (0.69) (1.06) (-15.60) (-15.66) 
d02 -0.01** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.03*** 1.64** 1.88*** -24.43*** -24.51*** 
 
(-2.26) (-2.62) (0.53) (-6.39) (2.33) (2.69) (-17.06) (-17.17) 
d03 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 -0.03*** 2.28*** 2.50*** -21.45*** -21.89*** 
 
(-3.06) (-3.39) (0.54) (-6.41) (3.26) (3.61) (-14.72) (-15.18) 
d04 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.03*** 4.21*** 4.42*** -23.94*** -24.40*** 
 
(-5.50) (-5.82) (-2.53) (-7.97) (6.06) (6.39) (-16.46) (-17.04) 
d05 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.03*** 4.42*** 4.60*** -28.85*** -28.99*** 
 
(-5.90) (-6.18) (-3.90) (-8.67) (6.36) (6.65) (-20.30) (-20.69) 
d06 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.03*** 3.03*** 3.23*** -29.22*** -29.40*** 
 
(-3.59) (-3.89) (-1.04) (-7.15) (4.37) (4.68) (-20.48) (-20.93) 
dnyear0 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.41 0.40 -3.25** -3.11** 
 
(-0.78) (-0.76) (-1.40) (-1.31) (0.69) (0.68) (-2.20) (-2.14) 
doyear0 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.01*** -0.85 -1.10* -0.39 -0.21 
 
(1.45) (1.84) (1.26) (3.69) (-1.28) (-1.67) (-0.25) (-0.13) 
dpn -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.82** 0.84** -0.36 0.16 
 
(-2.68) (-2.73) (-6.87) (-6.96) (2.03) (2.09) (-0.29) (0.14) 
dpr 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.01 0.00 -1.53* 0.00 -0.73 
 
(.) (1.82) (.) (1.64) (.) (-1.80) (.) (-0.44) 
aceh 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 1.65* 0.00 6.22*** 
 
(.) (-1.70) (.) (-0.07) (.) (1.65) (.) (2.84) 
papua 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 -0.76 0.00 11.40*** 
 
(.) (1.32) (.) (1.88) (.) (-0.97) (.) (5.87) 
Constant 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 65.09*** 64.99*** 65.16*** 64.11*** 
 
(17.64) (16.88) (22.11) (13.20) (101.18) (96.05) (64.48) (53.55) 
Observations 4,255 4,255 4,113 4,113 4,255 4,255 2,357 2,357 
R-squared 0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.10 
 
0.45 
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Table D6. Restricted sample estimates for health outcomes (continued) 
 
Variable BAtt DPT Pol KB 
 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
new06 0.76 0.74 2.86* 2.90** 1.91 1.71 1.02 0.83 
 
(0.62) (0.63) (1.93) (2.10) (1.28) (1.24) (1.47) (1.21) 
d95 2.23 2.36 -2.70 -5.15*** -11.62*** 
 
2.87*** 2.88*** 
 
(1.35) (1.41) (-1.52) (-3.30) (-6.51) 
 
(3.03) (3.03) 
d96 8.23*** 8.27*** -0.85 -3.20** -4.72*** 6.98*** 2.48*** 2.47*** 
 
(5.03) (5.02) (-0.48) (-2.09) (-2.68) (4.46) (2.65) (2.63) 
d97 11.75*** 11.80*** 2.36 
 
1.27 12.97*** 4.95*** 4.94*** 
 
(7.15) (7.13) (1.34) 
 
(0.72) (8.28) (5.30) (5.26) 
d98 9.07*** 9.12*** 1.11 -1.42 0.40 11.94*** 5.20*** 5.22*** 
 
(5.66) (5.67) (0.66) (-0.94) (0.24) (7.75) (5.70) (5.70) 
d99 19.76*** 19.76*** 3.96** 1.47 -1.96 9.64*** 4.67*** 4.69*** 
 
(11.87) (11.82) (2.15) (0.87) (-1.06) (5.64) (4.94) (4.94) 
d00 22.36*** 22.12*** 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
2.30** 2.28** 
 
(12.58) (12.40) (.) 
 
(.) 
 
(2.28) (2.26) 
d01 23.61*** 23.44*** 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.62 0.56 
 
(14.13) (13.98) (.) 
 
(.) 
 
(0.65) (0.59) 
d02 23.44*** 23.26*** 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
2.57*** 2.51** 
 
(13.58) (13.44) (.) 
 
(.) 
 
(2.61) (2.55) 
d03 26.40*** 25.84*** 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
3.86*** 3.64*** 
 
(15.02) (14.72) (.) 
 
(.) 
 
(3.86) (3.64) 
d04 28.80*** 28.03*** -4.68*** -7.44*** -10.54*** 0.65 6.31*** 6.04*** 
 
(16.41) (16.02) (-3.41) (-4.19) (-7.66) (0.36) (6.32) (6.05) 
d05 26.69*** 26.16*** -1.85 -4.52*** -7.36*** 3.99** 6.78*** 6.61*** 
 
(15.57) (15.31) (-1.41) (-2.66) (-5.59) (2.31) (6.95) (6.78) 
d06 28.01*** 27.45*** 0.00 -2.70 0.00 11.33*** 7.74*** 7.57*** 
 
(16.28) (16.01) (.) (-1.58) (.) (6.53) (7.90) (7.73) 
dnyear0 -4.69*** -4.13** -4.09 -3.84 -1.85 -1.84 -1.96* -1.81* 
 
(-2.64) (-2.33) (-1.39) (-1.32) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-1.94) (-1.79) 
doyear0 -0.89 -0.99 -1.68 -2.02 -1.30 -1.58 -0.31 -0.36 
 
(-0.46) (-0.52) (-0.53) (-0.65) (-0.41) (-0.51) (-0.29) (-0.33) 
dpn -5.20*** -4.43*** -1.48 -1.50 -1.07 -1.07 -2.72*** -2.37*** 
 
(-3.45) (-3.02) (-0.74) (-0.80) (-0.53) (-0.57) (-3.20) (-2.83) 
dpr 0.00 -1.52 0.00 -3.85 0.00 -3.57 0.00 -3.67 
 
(.) (-0.49) (.) (-1.42) (.) (-1.37) (.) (-1.56) 
aceh 0.00 6.61 0.00 -17.66*** 0.00 -13.78*** 0.00 -12.15*** 
 
(.) (1.59) (.) (-4.99) (.) (-4.07) (.) (-3.86) 
papua 0.00 -10.73*** 0.00 -3.64 0.00 -0.67 0.00 -19.62*** 
 
(.) (-2.97) (.) (-1.16) (.) (-0.22) (.) (-7.22) 
Constant 38.80*** 39.63*** 34.73*** 38.97*** 42.89*** 32.61*** 45.75*** 47.82*** 
 
(31.84) (22.26) (26.18) (24.43) (32.16) (20.54) (65.92) (39.33) 
Observations 2,349 2,349 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 2,360 2,360 
R-squared 0.25 
 
0.04 
 
0.12 
 
0.07 
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Table D6. Restricted sample estimates for education outcomes  
 
Variable AdLit AdLitP NERSMP NERSMPP 
 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
new06 -1.50*** -1.11** -1.75*** -1.34** -0.29 -0.08 0.05 0.32 
 
(-3.11) (-2.39) (-3.11) (-2.46) (-0.35) (-0.10) (0.05) (0.33) 
d95 -1.41** -1.39** -1.72*** -1.69*** -0.77 -0.79 -0.74 -0.76 
 
(-2.52) (-2.47) (-2.63) (-2.58) (-0.68) (-0.69) (-0.53) (-0.55) 
d96 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 2.77** 2.78** 4.11*** 4.13*** 
 
(-0.13) (-0.11) (-0.03) (-0.02) (2.46) (2.47) (3.00) (3.02) 
d97 1.62*** 1.63*** 1.88*** 1.89*** 6.64*** 6.65*** 7.40*** 7.42*** 
 
(2.92) (2.93) (2.91) (2.92) (5.91) (5.92) (5.40) (5.42) 
d98 2.67*** 2.70*** 3.25*** 3.29*** 6.11*** 6.16*** 6.50*** 6.53*** 
 
(4.93) (4.97) (5.13) (5.19) (5.55) (5.62) (4.85) (4.89) 
d99 2.84*** 2.86*** 3.63*** 3.65*** 7.96*** 8.02*** 9.73*** 9.76*** 
 
(5.05) (5.07) (5.52) (5.55) (6.98) (7.06) (7.00) (7.06) 
d00 1.68*** 1.69*** 2.62*** 2.63*** 8.22*** 8.29*** 9.77*** 9.84*** 
 
(2.79) (2.80) (3.74) (3.74) (6.77) (6.85) (6.60) (6.68) 
d01 3.33*** 3.37*** 4.35*** 4.39*** 10.27*** 10.35*** 12.26*** 12.33*** 
 
(5.87) (5.93) (6.57) (6.62) (8.95) (9.06) (8.76) (8.87) 
d02 3.95*** 4.01*** 5.39*** 5.44*** 9.28*** 9.38*** 10.34*** 10.46*** 
 
(6.73) (6.82) (7.86) (7.93) (7.83) (7.96) (7.16) (7.29) 
d03 4.03*** 4.12*** 5.77*** 5.85*** 12.95*** 13.09*** 14.48*** 14.63*** 
 
(6.68) (6.84) (8.19) (8.32) (10.75) (10.96) (9.86) (10.07) 
d04 4.66*** 4.71*** 6.40*** 6.43*** 16.60*** 16.73*** 17.76*** 17.90*** 
 
(7.67) (7.77) (9.02) (9.09) (13.80) (14.07) (12.11) (12.39) 
d05 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
16.68*** 16.80*** 17.71*** 17.85*** 
 
(.) 
 
(.) 
 
(14.18) (14.44) (12.35) (12.62) 
d06 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
18.56*** 18.67*** 18.81*** 18.92*** 
 
(.) 
 
(.) 
 
(15.72) (16.00) (13.07) (13.34) 
dnyear0 0.31 0.39 0.06 0.16 1.39 1.42 -0.36 -0.36 
 
(0.52) (0.65) (0.08) (0.23) (1.14) (1.18) (-0.24) (-0.25) 
doyear0 -0.13 -0.09 -0.24 -0.20 -1.29 -1.21 -2.20 -2.08 
 
(-0.20) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.26) (-0.98) (-0.93) (-1.38) (-1.31) 
dpn 0.40 0.30 0.35 0.29 0.98 0.81 0.74 0.45 
 
(0.71) (0.55) (0.54) (0.46) (0.96) (0.82) (0.59) (0.37) 
dpr 0.00 0.78 0.00 1.44 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.33 
 
(.) (0.53) (.) (0.82) (.) (0.06) (.) (0.62) 
aceh 0.00 -0.43 0.00 -0.90 0.00 8.79*** 0.00 7.95*** 
 
(.) (-0.22) (.) (-0.39) (.) (3.27) (.) (2.77) 
papua 0.00 -14.95*** 0.00 -16.84*** 0.00 -16.09*** 0.00 -16.57*** 
 
(.) (-8.87) (.) (-8.32) (.) (-6.88) (.) (-6.60) 
Constant 86.84*** 87.96*** 82.36*** 83.64*** 45.39*** 46.07*** 45.39*** 45.95*** 
 
(208.98) (118.20) (169.65) (94.27) (54.26) (39.10) (44.52) (34.23) 
Observations 1,923 1,923 1,923 1,923 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 
R-squared 0.13 
 
0.17 
 
0.27 
 
0.21 
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Table D6. Restricted sample estimates for education outcomes (continued) 
 
Variable NERSMA NERSMAP MYr DOPSc 
 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
new06 -0.87 -0.62 -0.85 -0.56 -0.02 -0.02 0.17 0.08 
 
(-1.11) (-0.81) (-0.92) (-0.63) (-0.66) (-0.51) (1.28) (0.67) 
d95 -1.62 -1.62 -1.77 -1.76 -0.01 -0.01 0.38** 0.38** 
 
(-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.40) (-1.40) (-0.12) (-0.12) (2.12) (2.14) 
d96 -0.34 -0.33 -0.51 -0.50 0.11** 0.11** -0.20 -0.20 
 
(-0.32) (-0.31) (-0.41) (-0.40) (2.44) (2.45) (-1.13) (-1.14) 
d97 2.67** 2.68** 4.23*** 4.23*** 0.19*** 0.19*** -0.77*** -0.77*** 
 
(2.51) (2.51) (3.40) (3.41) (4.23) (4.24) (-4.36) (-4.36) 
d98 3.30*** 3.35*** 4.36*** 4.42*** 0.28*** 0.28*** -0.25 -0.26 
 
(3.17) (3.21) (3.59) (3.64) (6.42) (6.51) (-1.45) (-1.54) 
d99 4.53*** 4.59*** 6.49*** 6.55*** 0.40*** 0.40*** -0.61*** -0.61*** 
 
(4.20) (4.25) (5.16) (5.22) (8.96) (9.04) (-3.40) (-3.42) 
d00 3.80*** 3.86*** 3.70*** 3.79*** 0.41*** 0.41*** -0.78*** -0.79*** 
 
(3.30) (3.35) (2.75) (2.82) (8.59) (8.62) (-4.09) (-4.17) 
d01 4.83*** 4.90*** 6.06*** 6.13*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.87*** -0.87*** 
 
(4.44) (4.51) (4.78) (4.85) (-7.13) (-7.09) (-4.84) (-4.87) 
d02 5.69*** 5.75*** 6.41*** 6.49*** 0.19*** 0.19*** -0.51*** -0.50*** 
 
(5.07) (5.13) (4.90) (4.97) (4.10) (4.13) (-2.76) (-2.70) 
d03 8.01*** 8.12*** 8.69*** 8.79*** 0.25*** 0.25*** -0.96*** -0.94*** 
 
(7.02) (7.14) (6.52) (6.63) (5.36) (5.37) (-5.08) (-5.03) 
d04 12.97*** 13.02*** 13.04*** 13.11*** 0.36*** 0.36*** -1.39*** -1.35*** 
 
(11.38) (11.48) (9.81) (9.94) (7.64) (7.64) (-7.33) (-7.31) 
d05 13.96*** 14.05*** 14.39*** 14.49*** 0.38*** 0.38*** -1.55*** -1.52*** 
 
(12.52) (12.67) (11.07) (11.24) (8.26) (8.26) (-8.36) (-8.39) 
d06 16.03*** 16.09*** 17.50*** 17.56*** 0.42*** 0.42*** -1.16*** -1.13*** 
 
(14.33) (14.46) (13.41) (13.58) (9.20) (9.20) (-6.22) (-6.21) 
dnyear0 0.53 0.57 -0.36 -0.28 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 
 
(0.46) (0.50) (-0.27) (-0.21) (-0.78) (-0.62) (-0.18) (-0.63) 
doyear0 -1.04 -1.00 -0.72 -0.63 -0.07 -0.07 -0.14 -0.14 
 
(-0.84) (-0.80) (-0.50) (-0.44) (-1.29) (-1.32) (-0.70) (-0.67) 
dpn 1.53 1.36 1.14 0.93 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 
 
(1.58) (1.43) (1.01) (0.84) (-0.76) (-0.60) (-0.44) (-0.76) 
dpr 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.22 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.20 
 
(.) (0.04) (.) (0.48) (.) (-0.57) (.) (0.99) 
aceh 0.00 7.61** 0.00 7.06** 0.00 0.33** 0.00 -0.41 
 
(.) (2.35) (.) (2.08) (.) (2.15) (.) (-1.53) 
papua 0.00 -11.85*** 0.00 -13.37*** 0.00 -0.38*** 0.00 0.10 
 
(.) (-4.22) (.) (-4.53) (.) (-2.88) (.) (0.42) 
Constant 26.21*** 26.76*** 26.43*** 26.98*** 6.23*** 6.25*** 2.64*** 2.67*** 
 
(33.07) (20.69) (28.60) (19.14) (191.11) (107.65) (20.04) (17.61) 
Observations 2,360 2,360 2,356 2,356 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,360 
R-squared 0.27 
 
0.22 
 
0.22 
 
0.10 
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Table D6. Restricted sample estimates for education outcomes (continued) 
 
Variable DOMSc DOHSc 
 
FE RE FE RE 
new06 -0.19 -0.15 -0.09 -0.94 
 
(-0.40) (-0.35) (-0.10) (-1.14) 
d95 0.76 0.67 0.65 0.51 
 
(1.14) (1.01) (0.50) (0.39) 
d96 0.39 0.40 2.42* 2.41* 
 
(0.60) (0.61) (1.88) (1.88) 
d97 0.39 0.40 0.72 0.69 
 
(0.60) (0.61) (0.57) (0.54) 
d98 0.53 0.42 0.61 0.39 
 
(0.83) (0.66) (0.48) (0.31) 
d99 -0.59 -0.67 1.06 0.92 
 
(-0.88) (-1.02) (0.81) (0.71) 
d00 -1.49** -1.60** -5.48*** -5.48*** 
 
(-2.09) (-2.27) (-3.92) (-3.97) 
d01 -2.35*** -2.42*** -5.91*** -6.10*** 
 
(-3.49) (-3.65) (-4.54) (-4.75) 
d02 0.50 0.42 0.04 -0.20 
 
(0.72) (0.62) (0.03) (-0.15) 
d03 0.33 0.18 1.44 1.36 
 
(0.46) (0.26) (1.05) (1.02) 
d04 -1.83*** -2.02*** -2.18 -2.36* 
 
(-2.59) (-2.97) (-1.60) (-1.79) 
d05 -1.42** -1.66** 0.49 0.21 
 
(-2.06) (-2.49) (0.37) (0.17) 
d06 -2.07*** -2.32*** 1.70 1.45 
 
(-3.00) (-3.48) (1.27) (1.13) 
dnyear0 -0.49 -0.42 -0.02 -0.06 
 
(-0.69) (-0.62) (-0.01) (-0.05) 
doyear0 0.12 -0.08 -0.64 -0.90 
 
(0.16) (-0.11) (-0.43) (-0.62) 
dpn -0.87 -0.69 -1.34 -0.62 
 
(-1.45) (-1.31) (-1.13) (-0.61) 
dpr 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.31 
 
(.) (0.16) (.) (1.20) 
aceh 0.00 -1.24 0.00 -0.95 
 
(.) (-1.63) (.) (-0.66) 
papua 0.00 1.09 0.00 1.73 
 
(.) (1.57) (.) (1.23) 
Constant 6.28*** 6.28*** 13.12*** 13.11*** 
 
(12.80) (11.98) (13.69) (12.90) 
Observations 2,352 2,352 2,301 2,301 
R-squared 0.05 
 
0.05 
  
 
 
 
112 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Alm, James, Robert H. Aten, and Roy Bahl. 2001. Can Indonesia decentralise successfully? 
Plans, problems and prospects. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 37 (1):83-102. 
 
Alm, James, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Sri Mulyani Indrawati, ed. 2004. Reforming 
intergovernmental fiscal relations and the rebuilding of Indonesia: the 'Big Bang' 
program and its economic consequences. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: 
Elgar. 
 
Bahl, Roy, and Johannes Linn. 1992. Urban public finance in developing countries. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Bahl, Roy, and Sally Wallace. 2005. Public financing in developing and transition countries. 
Public Budgeting & Finance 25:83-98. 
 
Balisacan, Arsenio M., Ernesto M. Pernia, and Abuzar Asra. 2003. Revisiting growth and 
poverty reduction in Indonesia: what do subnational data show? Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies 39 (3):329-351. 
 
Bardhan, Pranab, and Dilip Mookherjee. 2006. Decentralisation and accountability in 
infrastructure delivery in developing countries. Economic Journal 116 (508):101-127. 
 
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. How much should we trust 
differences-in-differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1):249-275. 
 
Brodjonegoro, Bambang , and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. 2002. An analysis of Indonesia's transfer 
system: recent performance and future prospects. International Studies Program Working 
Paper 02-13.  
 
Crook, R, and A.R Sverrisson. 1999. To what extent can decentralized forms of government 
enhance the development of pro-poor policies and improve poverty-alleviation outcomes. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/DfiD-Project-
Papers/crook.pdf (accessed July, 2007)  
 
113 
 
Dasgupta, Basab, Ambar Narayan, and Emmanuel Skoufias. 2009. Measuring the quality of 
education and health services. The use of perception data from Indonesia. The World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 5033. 
 
Davoodi, Hamid , and Heng-fu Zou. 1998. Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: a cross-
country study. Journal of Urban Economics 43 (2):244-257. 
 
Faguet, Jean-Paul, and Fabio Sanchez. 2006. Decentralization's effects on educational outcomes 
in Bolivia and Columbia. Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and 
Related Disciplines, LSE, STICERD - Development Economics Papers. 
 
Fane, George. 2003. Change and continuity in Indonesia's new fiscal decentralisation 
arrangements. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 39 (2):159-176. 
 
Fitrani, Fitria, Bert Hofman, and Kai Kaiser. 2005. Unity in diversity? The creation of new local 
governments in a decentralising Indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 41 
(1):57-79. 
 
Imansyah, Mohammad Handry, and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. 2009. Understanding sub-national 
government fragmentation in Indonesia and options for reform: Background for a "grand 
strategy" for pemekaran. Jakarta: Asian Development Bank. 
 
Lewis, Blane D. 2005. Indonesian local government spending, taxing and saving: an explanation 
of pre- and post-decentralization fiscal outcomes. Asian Economic Journal 19 (3):291-
317. 
 
Lewis, Blane D., and Daan Pattinasarany. 2009. Determining citizen satisfaction with local 
public education in Indonesia: the significance of actual service quality and governance 
conditions. Growth and Change 40 (1):85. 
 
McCulloch, Neil, and Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir. 2008. Endowment, location or luck? 
Evaluating the determinants of sub-national growth in decentralized Indonesia. The 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 4769. 
 
McNab, Robert Martin. 2001. An empirical examination of the outcomes of fiscal 
decentralization. Ph.D diss., Georgia State University. 
 
114 
 
Musgrave, Richard A. 1969. Theories of fiscal federalism. Public Finance 24 (4):521-536. 
 
Oates, Wallace E. 1972. Fiscal federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Oosterman, Andre. 2007. Costs and benefits of new region creation in Indonesia. Jakarta: DSF 
Indonesia. 
 
PERCIK. 2008. Proses dan implikasi sosial politik pemekaran: studi kasus di Sambas dan Buton. 
Jakarta: USAID, DRSP, PERCIK. 
 
Prud'homme, Remy. 1995. The dangers of decentralization. World Bank Research Observer 10 
(2):201-220. 
 
Qibthiyyah, Riatu Mariatul. Essays on political and fiscal decentralization  [Text (Thesis).] 
2008. Available from unrestricted http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08152008-
071107/  
 
Robalino, David A., Oscar F. Picazo, and Albertus Voetberg. 2001. Does fiscal decentralization 
improve health outcomes? Evidence from a cross-country analysis. The World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper Series 2565. 
 
Schwartz, B. J , David Guilkey, and Rachel Rachelis. 2002. Decentralization, allocative 
efficiency and health service outcomes in the Philippines. In Measure evaluation. Chapel 
Hill: Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
 
Shah, Anwar. 1999. Balance, accountability, and responsiveness: lessons about decentralization. 
The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 2021. 
 
Shah, Anwar, and Raja Shankar. 2001. Bridging the economic gap within nations: a scorecard on 
the performance of regional development policies in reducing regional income 
disparities. The World Bank  Policy Research Working Paper Series 2717. 
 
Sidik, Machfud, and Kadjatmiko. 2004. Combining expenditure assignment, revenue assignment 
and grant design in Indonesia's fiscal decentralization. In Reforming intergovernmental 
fiscal relations and the rebuilding of Indonesia: the 'Big Bang' program and its economic 
115 
 
consequences, ed. Alm, James, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Sri Mulyani Indrawati. 
Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. 
 
Silver, Christopher, Iwan J. Azis, and Larry Schroeder. 2001. Intergovernmental transfers and 
decentralization in Indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 37 (3):345 - 362. 
 
Sole-Olle, A, and A Esteller-More. 2005. Decentralized provision of public inputs, government 
responsiveness to local needs and regional growth. Evidence from Spain. Working paper, 
Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.  
 
Tanzi, Vito, Michael Bruno, and Boris Pleskovic. 1996. Fiscal federalism and decentralization: a 
review of some efficiency and macroeconomic aspects. In Annual World Bank 
Conference on Development Economics, 1995. Washington, D.C: World Bank. 
 
Wallis, J.J , and W.E Oates. 1988. Decentralization in the public sector: an empirical study of 
state and local government. In Fiscal federalism: quantitative studies, ed. Rosen, Harvey. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Widayanti, Winefrida, and Asep Suharyadi. 2008. The state of local governance and public 
service in decentralized Indonesia in 2006: findings from the Governance and 
Decentralization Survey 2 (GDS2). ed. Weatherley, Kate. Jakarta: SMERU Research 
Institute. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge 
and London: MIT Press. 
 
World Bank, The. 2007. Spending for development: making the most of Indonesia's new 
opportunities. Indonesia public expenditure review 2007. Jakarta: The World Bank. 
 
Zhang, Tao, and Heng-fu Zou. 1998. Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic 
growth in China. Journal of Public Economics 67 (2):221-240. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
VITA 
 
Rentanida Renata Simatupang was born and raised in Jakarta, Indonesia. She graduated 
from University of Indonesia, Depok, in 2001 with a bachelor degree in Economics. While 
finishing her undergraduate education, she was a teaching assistant at Department of Economics, 
University of Indonesia, and worked part time as research assistant at several research 
institutions within University of Indonesia.  
She received full scholarship from USAID Indonesia in 2002 to continue her education at 
Georgia State University as a part of Indonesian Master Program in Applied Economics. In 2003, 
she was awarded the Master of Arts in Economics Award and was accepted to attend PhD  in 
Economics program, also at Georgia State University. 
As a graduate research assistant at the International Studies Program Andrew Young 
School of Policy Studies, Renata has extensive research experience in decentralization, public 
finance in developing countries and public sector management. From 2003 to 2005 she worked 
under supervision of Dr. L.F. Jameson Boex and later with Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez which 
give her the skills and expertise to work with developing country cases. 
Renata earned her PhD in Economics in November 2009. After finishing her doctoral 
degree, she will return to Indonesia to continue teaching and conducting research in public 
finance management in Indonesia. 
 
